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ABSTRACT
The decentralization of budget decisions from the central office to the schoolhouse has emerged
as a system-changing strategy to give principals the flexibility to allocate their resources to areas
most likely to improve educational outcomes (Snow & Williamson, 2015). Budget
decentralization is viewed as a promising reform strategy, especially for low-performing schools
that are eager to apply new approaches to meet their students’ needs (Fermanich, Odden, &
Archibald, 2000). As more districts have announced a transition to decentralized budget
decision-making, scholars have observed that schools have generally stayed with long-standing
budget practices and have not embraced autonomy (Bjork & Blase, 2009; Honig & Rainey,
2012). The theoretical framework of distributed leadership provides insight into why school
leaders might exercise, or might not exercise, this newfound budget authority. The focus of this
dissertation was a large urban/suburban school district in Georgia, which has made substantial
investments in creating school-level budget autonomy. This study sought to understand whether

school leaders exercise budget flexibility when a district has built an environment supportive of
decentralization by enacting key distributed leadership provisions. Ninety-four traditional public
schools were included in this study. The budget allocation from the central office and the
submitted school budget were compared. This study set out to analyze four main budget
groupings: (a) teachers, (b) paraprofessionals, (c) support personnel, and (d) non personnel. This
study found that the behavior of principals did significantly differ among elementary, middle,
and high schools. While the majority of budget changes were not statistically significant, middle
school principals did significantly reduce their teacher allocation, and elementary principals did
significantly reduce their non personnel spending. Additionally, low-performing schools
exercised this autonomy at greater rates than their peers in high performing schools. Finally, the
amount of time operating in a decentralized budget environment did not lead to a statistically
significant increase in the exercise of budget autonomy. This insight into the degree to which
educational leaders exercise budget autonomy can inform the decentralization efforts that are
currently underway in district offices across the country.

INDEX WORDS: Budget Autonomy, Decentralization, Distribution Leadership, School-Based
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CHAPTER 1
BUDGET AUTONOMY IN A DECENTRALIZED SCHOOL SYSTEM
In an effort to improve student achievement, some policymakers and districts have sought
to decentralize large school system bureaucracies to empower local leaders (Bjork & Blase,
2009). Although decentralization can take many forms, it is broadly defined as the transfer of
decision-making from centralized leadership to lower operating units, typically in very large
organizations (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; Ouchi, 2006; Steinberg, 2013). Decentralization
initiatives are becoming more popular because they hold substantial promise to inspire leaders to
take greater control of their school's educational program (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; Ouchi, 2006;
Steinberg, 2013). School systems in cities such as Chicago, New York City, Los Angeles,
Boston, and many others have applied aspects of this reform in an attempt to make their systems
more responsive to the unique needs of their diverse communities (Steinberg, 2014).
The underlying rationale for the growth of decentralization as a district reform strategy is
twofold: to improve decision-making and to increase accountability. Some leaders argue for
decision-making that is closer to student activity, so that it will be more responsive and more
effective (Snow & Williamson, 2015). Second, leaders contend accountability can be improved
when local managers have control over resources, so that they can achieve their goals as they
best see fit (Snow & Williamson, 2015).
Overview of decentralization.
In the context of school districts, decentralization is generally applied to three main
organizational dimensions: personnel, curriculum, and budget. Decentralization in personnel
management allows the principal more flexibility in staff hiring decisions (Ouchi, 2006).
Curriculum decentralization permits more local control over the content being taught and the
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instructional tools used to deliver that content (Ouchi, 2006). Finally, budget decentralization
provides the principal with control over how resources are utilized to meet the school’s
objectives (Ouchi, 2006).
Of these three types of decentralization, budget autonomy is foundational and therefore
the most commonly used strategy in decentralization initiatives (Ouchi, 2006; Snow &
Williamson, 2015). Steinberg (2014) noted that “‘true decentralization’ requires budgetary
control to be given to each school otherwise the ability of schools to control personnel or
curriculum is substantially limited” (p.3). Some policymakers emphasize budget autonomy
because of the belief that school site leaders may be best positioned to allocate scarce resources
to meet the needs of their unique student demographics (Boudreaux, 2017).
Despite an increase in the frequency of decentralization policies as a school reform
strategy, most aspects of decentralization provisions remain unimplemented (Goertz & Stiefel,
1998; Honig & Rainey, 2012). Many scholars note that decentralization policies, and more
specifically budgeting policies, have not yielded different decisions at the local level (Bjork &
Blase, 2009; Honig & Rainey, 2012). The common observation by scholars is that schools have
generally stayed with long-standing budget practice and have not embraced the opportunity of
budget autonomy (Bjork & Blase, 2009; Honig & Rainey, 2012).
This study seeks to ascertain whether school leaders will exercise budget flexibility when
a district supports its decentralization initiative by investing in training and issuing a formalized
policy. Moreover, this study will investigate whether budget autonomy is affected by a school’s
level of student performance and the time needed to implement reforms.
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A distributed leadership perspective of decentralization.
Although principals have the opportunity to exercise all sorts of flexibility in a
decentralized environment, “there is little research that examines the role that principals play”
when they are offered this additional budget autonomy (Mayer, Donaldson, LeChasseur, Welton,
& Cobb, 2013, p. 726). To better understand why some principals may choose not to exercise
this additional decision-making authority, it is useful to apply the theoretical framework of
distributed leadership. Distributed leadership offers a framework for understanding the key
attributes required for those outside the traditional leadership structure to exercise decisionmaking (Harris, 2013). Two key structures that are essential for a distributed leadership
environment are an explicit policy that defines the roles of leaders and appropriate training for
school-based personnel now assuming new decision-making authority (Harris, 2013; Honig &
Rainey, 2012).
While distributed leadership theory is often used to explain the relationship between
principal and teacher (Hairon & Goh, 2015), the same reporting relationship and power dynamic
exists between the central office and the school site (Mayer, Donaldson, LeChasseur, Welton, &
Cobb, 2013). Distributed leadership is a prominent contemporary leadership theory in education
because it provides context to the relationship between those who have had historical
responsibility for a set of decisions and newly empowered decision-makers (Hairon & Goh,
2015). From a distributed perspective, leadership is not just the function of one particular group
to another in a school district, but rather a set of activities leaders at all levels engage in with
others to achieve a specific task such as school reform (Mayer et al., 2013). By focusing on
leadership as an activity and not a particular position, the definition of leadership from Mayer et
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al. (2013) permits a broader application of distributed leadership to include all parts of the
organization.
An analysis of a district’s experience with decentralization.
This study will take place in the state of Georgia as it provides a unique example where
the policy levers are in place to support distributed leadership which may lead to the exercise of
budget autonomy. Policymakers in Georgia seized on the idea of local control and flexibility and
passed the Charter System Act of 2007 (Georgia Department of Education, 2017). A Charter
System is a school district that has a performance contract with the State Board of Education
granting freedom from most of the state education code in exchange for a commitment to meet
firm accountability targets (Georgia Department of Education, 2017). Although individual
districts in other states have experimented with various decentralization reforms, a structured
commitment to decentralization like the Charter System Act is unique to Georgia (Badertscher,
2013). In fact, Georgia is currently the only state that provides systematic governance flexibility
options to entire school districts (Kramer, Lane, & Tanner, 2017).
To investigate the impact of decentralization on principal behavior, it will be useful to
investigate one Georgia district in detail that has formalized a Charter System contract. This
district will be given a pseudonym, Spring Valley County Schools (SVCS). In 2012, the SVCS
board of education entered into a contract with the State to become a charter system1. SVCS, an
urban/suburban district serves over 96,000 students, has implemented budget decentralization
and has embraced the key attributes of distributed leadership through policy structure and
training investments. By joining the charter system, SVCS made an explicit commitment to

1

I did not include specific references to certain data in order to preserve the school district’s anonymity.
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budget autonomy and formally moved budgetary decision-making from the central office to the
school site.
Additionally, SVCS has invested heavily in training and professional development to
promote distributed leadership to school site leaders. In addition to published training materials,
each principal participated in a series of governance and resource allocation training sessions by
a Boston-based consulting firm (Woo, 2012). Finally, SVCS has demonstrated a commitment to
financial transparency which permits a school-level analysis of budget decisions.
Based on publicly-available resource allocation and budget data, this study will analyze
the actual execution of budget autonomy, which has characterized current district
decentralization efforts. SVCS will be the focus of this analysis. While this study does not seek
to evaluate the impact of decentralization on student learning outcomes, it aims to provide
policymakers and district leaders’ insight into one district’s experience with budget
decentralization in an environment where the distribution of leadership has been a strategic focus
of district reform. While in some cases the principal may agree with the standard budget
prescribed by the district finance office, decentralization initiatives are predicated on the idea
that each school has a unique set of needs based on unique student populations (Honig, 2012).
This study will not assess the quality of the decision-making of the principal, but rather seeks to
understand whether a policy of budget flexibility leads to a change in school-level budget
decisions, which is the explicit purpose of the reform.
This study will investigate whether a decentralization effort leads to the exercise of
budget flexibility at the school level in a distributed leadership environment. Rather than assess
the success of decentralization by focusing on principals’ perceptions or their stated interest, this
study will examine the actual exercise of different decisions under these decentralization
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policies. As a result of its substantial commitment to a distributed leadership environment in both
policy and practice, SVCS offers a unique opportunity to observe the execution of budget
autonomy. If the difference between the district-level allocation of school resources and the
actual school-level budget decisions prove to be statistically significant, then the SVCS case
would run counter to the research because this decentralization initiative achieved its intended
purpose of budget autonomy. That insight can inform the implementation decisions of districts
that are pursuing this reform to better position this initiative for success.
Research Questions
Based on the research of the critical features necessary for the exercise of budget
autonomy as well as the insight provided by distributed leadership theory, the following research
questions guided this study:
RQ1:

To what extent do schools exercise budget flexibility when it is provided in a
distributed leadership environment?

RQ2:

When provided with budget flexibility in a distributed leadership environment,
to what extent does the exercise of that autonomy vary by school performance?

RQ3: When operating in a distributed leadership environment, to what extent are school
leaders more likely to change their budgets after they have been given budget
autonomy for multiple years?

7

Definition of Terms
Decentralization – In the case of school contexts, decentralization efforts provide
“principals with greater autonomy over school-based management decisions related to the
school’s budget, staff development, curriculum, instruction, and schedule” (Steinberg & Cox,
2017, p. 131). Decentralization refers to policies enacted by school boards to push decisionmaking to local school levels.
Budget autonomy – Action taken at local school level school to customize resource
allocation to best meet student needs (Steinberg & Cox, 2017). School-based budgeting is
increased control over budgets at the local-level where school-level staff alter resource
allocations based on their local perspective (Stiefel, Schwartz, Portas, & Kim, 2003).
Distributed leadership –An approach to management where governance tasks are
assigned both formally and informally “across multiple leaders in a school, including principals,
assistant principals, curriculum specialists, reading or Title I teachers, and classroom teachers”
(Spillane, Halverson, & Diamond, 2001, p. 25).
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) – The CAFR is a budget reporting
document that districts can choose to publish that goes beyond the minimum requirements of
generally accepted accounting principles. These comprehensive annual financial reports are
evidence of full disclosure and a commitment to ensure all stakeholders have a common
understanding of district practice (Government Finance Officers Association, 2018).
Significance of Study
Decentralizing budget decisions from the central office to the schoolhouse has emerged
as a system-changing strategy to give principals the flexibility to allocate their resources to
strategies most likely to improve educational outcomes (Snow & Williamson, 2015). Despite an
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increase in the frequency of decentralization policies as a school reform strategy, most aspects of
decentralization provisions remain unimplemented (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; Honig & Rainey,
2012). Many scholars note that decentralization policies, and more specifically budgeting
policies, have not yielded different decisions at the local level (Bjork & Blase, 2009; Honig &
Rainey, 2012).
If districts continue to implement a reform initiative that has no impact on behavior, it
can place a tremendous strain on an organization. Development and management of new
processes can consume significant amounts of school staffs’ time in ways that may distract from
the focus on teaching, which can then negatively impact learning (Honig & Rainey, 2012).
Poorly executed decentralization can have “deleterious effects, exhausting limited energy and
goodwill in futile exercises” (David, 1995, p. 8).
This study will fill a gap in the literature by investigating whether a decentralization
effort leads to the exercise of budget flexibility at the school level. This study does not seek to
assign value to the impact of decentralization on student outcomes; rather it will provide
policymakers and district leaders’ insight into one district’s experience with budget
decentralization in an environment where great care had been taken to build an environment that
incorporates the key attributes of distributed leadership. If the exercise of budget autonomy can
be found in a district that embraces distributed leadership, that insight can inform the
implementation in districts who are considering this reform.
Review of the Literature
Budget decentralization is viewed as a promising reform strategy, especially for lowperforming schools that are eager to apply new approaches to meet their students’ needs
(Fermanich et al., 2000). The literature of decentralization of authority paints a picture of a

9

reform strategy that had its success limited by the lack of execution at the school level (Goertz &
Stiefel, 1998; Honig & Rainey, 2012). The purpose of this study is to understand the degree to
which schools permitted budget flexibility and to provide insight into the viability of budget
decentralization as a reform strategy. This literature review will first consider the history of
school-based decision making broadly and autonomous budgeting in particular. This review will
conclude with an examination of the theoretical framework of distributed leadership and the
potential insight that this conceptual lens will provide into the exercise of budget autonomy.
Overview of decentralization.
Although decentralization can take many forms, it is broadly defined as the transfer of
decision-making from centralized leadership to lower operating units, typically in very large
organizations (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; Ouchi, 2006; Steinberg, 2013). In the context of schools,
the specific structure and substance of decentralization approaches vary, but the guiding belief
among advocates is that decentralization can increase the effectiveness of schools by placing
decision-making closest to the students (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998). This flexibility is designed to
enable principals to allocate resources towards opportunities for their students that would not be
possible in an environment without autonomy. There are several examples of how
decentralization could be employed at the school including more flexible staffing ratios, hiring
teachers from non-traditional backgrounds, and creative scheduling (Levenson, 2012).
School decentralization reform focused on three key organizational levers: personnel,
curriculum, and budget. First, decentralization in personnel management allows the principal
more flexibility in staff hiring decisions (Ouchi, 2006). Second, curriculum decentralization
permits more local control over the content being taught and the instructional tools used to
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deliver that content (Ouchi, 2006). Thirdly, budget decentralization provides the principal with
control over how resources are allocated in the school (Ouchi, 2006).
Budget autonomy is the most essential and most commonly used strategy in district
reform because resource allocation touches almost every decision made in the school house
(Ouchi, 2006; Snow & Williamson, 2015). As Steinberg (2014) noted, decentralization requires
budgetary control to be given to each school otherwise the ability of schools to control personnel
or curriculum is substantially limited. Resource allocation is key to enabling leaders to enact
school reform which has led to budget autonomy becoming the most common and preferred
aspect of decentralization (Ouchi, 2006). Additionally, some policymakers are drawn to budget
autonomy because of the belief that school site leaders may be best positioned to allocate scarce
resources to lend tailored educational support to their unique student population (Boudreaux,
2017).
Current model of school budgeting.
Traditional school budgets are driven centrally through administrative formulas that are
static and do not necessarily reflect the implicit and explicit challenges and opportunities of
increasingly diverse schools (Coffin & Cooper, 2018). School districts generally build their
budgets based on allocations that are made based on simple enrollment projections, not the
informed understanding of student needs (Coffin & Cooper, 2018). While school finance systems
across the country may vary, most allocate the vast majority of funding based on simple
enrollment calculations to ease in the management of large, complex school district budgets
(Snow & Williamson, 2015). For example, systems may have a general ratio that for every 25
students, a teacher is added to a budget and for every 350 students, funding for an assistant
principal position is then allocated (Curtis, Sinclair, & Malen, 2014). As a result, more than 95%
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of school-assigned resources are already slotted into positions with no local input involved
(Steinberg, 2014).
A standard allocation for all schools implies that central office leaders who create
budgets are best equipped to build a budget for schools and that schools should allocate
resources the same (Steinberg, 2014). Standard allocations may allow for ease of district
financial management, but it also may constrain principal behavior. In this type of traditional
environment, teachers and school leaders have little autonomy over critical budget allocation
decisions (Strong & Yoshida, 2014). This pervasive budgeting approach means that some desired
reforms that require local school customization are not funded because they were not directed
and administered from the central office (Levenson, 2012).
Early forms of decentralization: school-based budgeting.
School-based management is a construct built by district leaders to increase
accountability, improve administrative efficiency, and ensure stakeholder insight is factored into
school decision-making (Briggs & Wohlstetter, 2003). School-based management (SBM) and its
implementation vehicle, school-based councils, are one of the earliest forms of decentralization
that dates back to the 1980s (Briggs & Wohlstetter, 2003). SBM expanded in the 1980s because
funding increases in the 1970s led to a call for greater accountability (Steinberg, 2014).
By providing a vehicle for the school community to impact decisions, proponents argued
that SBM shifts the balance of power from the central office to the school community and
generates local ownership and commitment (Briggs & Wohlstetter, 2003). School-based councils
became the entity that brings decision-makers together and is representative of key stakeholders
in the school community. Systems began to invest in the establishment of school site councils
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which became a centerpiece of the school reform agenda beginning in the 1990s (Greenlee,
2007).
In practice, however, school-based councils had nominal authority – evidence suggests
upwards of 95 percent of the budget authority was often determined before dollars were allocated
to the school (Steinberg, 2014). Scholars suggest that school-based councils’ success was also
limited by lack of knowledge, lack of influence, and in some cases because they became a citizen
body that posed political risk to school boards (Snow & Williamson, 2015).
As a result of the perceived shortcomings of SBM, the most recent iterations of
decentralization focus on the principal as the locus of control (Steinberg 2014). Federal
education policy, through Race To The Top in 2010, encouraged states to build policies to
support local control as well as operate autonomous, non-charter public schools (Steinberg,
2014). Greenlee (2007) confirmed the outsized role of the principal in driving the agenda of
school governance councils in his Florida study when he noted that school leaders “deliberately
employ strategies to represent primarily the interests of the school and its employees” (p. 242).
The principal serves not only as the gate-keeper of information, but often has a pivotal role in
selecting or influencing the election of members to the council (Malen, 1994). In the new
principal focused model, SBM provides an important advisory function; the principal retains the
role of critical decision-maker.
Growth of decentralization.
Decentralization has grown in popularity as district leaders are investigating strategies to
help low-performing schools better to meet their students’ needs (Fermanich et al., 2000). The
underlying rationale behind this strategy is twofold. First, pushing decision-making closer to
those most-impacted by decisions or charged with their implementation will lead to more
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effective policies and strategies (Snow & Williamson, 2015). Second, government will be made
more responsive by providing managers with control over resources so that they can achieve
their goals as they best see fit (Snow & Williamson, 2015).
Elected leaders have historically favored centralized systems to bind administrative
leaders to policy and reduce the risk of shortfalls or misdirected resources (Snow & Williamson,
2015). Centralized systems have clear lines of authority and are designed to yield predictable
outcomes. This prevailing wisdom amongst school board leaders was to create larger more
professionalized agencies that could also generate scale efficiencies (Diem, Sampson, &
Browning, 2018).
As centralized systems grew and performance stalled, the response from reform
advocates was that large, unresponsive bureaucracies are too disconnected from stakeholders at
the school level to impact the school community (Snow & Williamson, 2015). To address these
concerns, policymakers were enlisted “to shift power and authority from central office
administration to school-level leadership” (Diem et al., 2018, p. 1). As part of this trend to
reinvent government, an important priority was to give school leadership increased control over
resources so they can achieve the goals as they see fit (Snow & Williamson, 2015).
The first well-documented school district to reflect this shift in authority occurred in
Edmonton, Canada, in 1976 (Ouchi, 2006). As a consequence of their success, empowering local
school sites with authority has developed a substantial following in large school systems that are
mired in underperformance (Ouchi, 2006). Since 2000, this innovation has been transplanted
across the sector to districts in Cincinnati, Houston, Seattle, New York City, Los Angeles, and
Chicago among others (Honig & Rainey, 2012; Miles & Roza, 2006; Ouchi, 2006; Steinberg,
2013).
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Challenges of budget decentralization implementation.
Despite an increase in the frequency of decentralization as a school reform strategy, most
aspects of decentralization provisions remain unimplemented (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; Honig &
Rainey, 2012). Many scholars note that decentralization policies, and more specifically
budgeting policies, have not yielded different decisions at the local level (Bjork & Blase, 2009;
Honig & Rainey, 2012). The common observation by scholars is that schools have generally
stayed with long-standing budget practice and have not embraced the opportunity of
decentralization (Bjork & Blase, 2009; Honig & Rainey, 2012).
The literature identifies two main aspects of organizational structure that impact the
adoption of budget autonomy: an explicit policy that guides leadership’s behavior and the
training of staff to prepare them to accept this additional responsibility.
The first criteria for embracing autonomy is the existence of explicit school budget
authority that specifies policies that define the role of district leaders. Without specific policies,
district leaders and elected officials can be swayed by a tendency to micromanage and political
pressures (Snow & Williamson, 2015). Harris (2013) argues that formalizing the leadership
structure goes a long way to create the conditions for distributed leadership. The reason a
formalized policy is necessary is to counter the central office’s struggle to relinquish control of
key local decision-making (Honig & Rainey, 2012; McKenzie & Locke, 2014; Strong &
Yoshida, 2014). The importance of formalized policy was observed in reviews of
decentralization efforts in Chicago, Denver, and Los Angeles. In those cases, there was a
common theme that institutional support for site-based decision-making, evidenced by
formalized policy, is a critical factor in the school’s decision to exercise local budget authority
(Hughes, 1993; Lauber & Warden, 1999).
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Scholars agree the other main limitation of decentralization implementation is that
schools are insufficiently trained to handle the complex challenges associated with local
management of school budgets (Honig & Rainey, 2012; Lauber & Warden, 1999; Mayer &
LeChasseur, 2013; Steinberg, 2014). Honig & Rainey (2012) concluded that the capacity
building of decentralization might be the most relevant impact, especially for school budgeting
given its complexity. As several reviews of school site-based management research concluded,
principals, school site council members, and teachers all needed additional professional
development but rarely received it (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; Honig & Rainey, 2012). There is
congruence in the research that without proper training, implementation of budget autonomy will
be limited (Stiefel et al., 2003; Wohlstetter, Datnow, & Park, 2008).
Decentralization as a strategy for low performing schools.
As the focus on turning around low performing schools has increased, district–school
relationship has come under increased scrutiny as a potential leverage point (Mayer et al., 2013).
There have generally been three models designed to reform this relationship to address chronic
low-performance: increasing district oversight through intensive intervention, state-level
takeover of governance, or granting those schools more autonomy to solve their own problems
(Mayer et al., 2013). Given the poor record of the first two approaches, there is promise in the
strategy of increasing autonomy (Mayer et al., 2013).
Limitations of current research.
Research on budget decentralization tends to focus on stated principal preference, not on
whether the principals actually exercise the afforded flexibility to impact their school budget
(Honig, 2012). One example of the current approach is a study of a decentralization reform in
Chicago Public Schools, known as the Autonomous Management and Performance Schools
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(AMPS) program, which investigated school leader’s preference for budget autonomy
(Steinberg, 2014). The researcher found 82 percent of the schools who were afforded flexibility
selected the “budget transfers” option, which allowed the school to exercise spending control
(Steinberg, 2014, p. 11). While the AMPS study demonstrates school leaders’ interest in
autonomy, the author did not analyze whether their budget decisions actually changed as a result
of the availability of flexibility. Data limitations were the cited reason why only preference, not
action was measured (Steinberg & Cox, 2015).
This lack of observed behavior was noted again in another budget decentralization case
study in Cordell Place School District in the Pacific Northwest (Fermanich et al., 2000). The
study did show that outcomes did improve during the period of decentralization, but there is no
evidence that schools actually utilized this budget authority to drive improvement (Fermanich et
al., 2000). The common thread in both cases was the researcher’s focus on the stated action of
the principal and not on the objective action of budget decision-making. This lack of
investigation of the observable exercise of budget autonomy is a common theme in the research
(Honig, 2012).
The distributed leadership conceptual model.
The study is framed by distributed leadership theory to provide insight into how leaders
assume additional leadership responsibilities, outside their traditional authority, to contribute to
the implementation of a reform strategy. The purpose of this section of the literature review is to
examine the role of distributed leadership on the viability of the execution of decentralized
budget policies.
Distributed leadership theory argues that there are multiple sources of influence within
any organization (Harris, 2013). The foundation of this theory is the idea that organization
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success is based on individuals in unstated and informal leadership roles assuming key decisionmaking authority (Harris & Spillane, 2008). The literature is guided by the seminal work of
Spillane’s research which has focused on leadership practice between leaders, followers and their
unique situations (Harris, 2013; Spillane et al., 2001).
While there seems to be a lack of universal definition of distributive leadership, a
working definition common among the literature is the “enacting [of] leadership tasks is often
distributed across multiple leaders in a school, including principals, assistant principals,
curriculum specialists, reading or Title I teachers, and classroom teachers” (Spillane et al., 2001,
p. 25). The concept has evolved from a pragmatic tool to distribute the work of an organization
to the leadership role of key actors (Tian, Risku, & Collin, 2016). There are a few common
distributed leadership principles that are consistent with this working definition, most notably it
requires multiple levels of involvement in decision-making, encompasses both formal and
informal leaders, and is ultimately concerned with improving leadership practice (Harris &
Spillane, 2008).
Distributed leadership theory is often grounded in the relationship between principal and
teacher (Hairon & Goh, 2015), yet it can also provide insight into the relationship between the
central office and the school site because the same reporting relationship and power dynamic
exist (Mayer et al., 2013). This broader application is consistent with Spillane’s original work on
the topic (Mayrowetz, 2008). From a distributed perspective, leadership is not just the function
of one particular group to another in a school district, but rather a set of activities leaders at all
levels engage in with others to achieve a specific task (Mayer et al., 2013). Mayer et al.,
concluded that distributed leadership could be applied when formal leadership is reimagined
because it provides a more “conceptually accurate depiction of the complex nature of leadership
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by suggesting that leadership is socially constructed and varies from situation to situation based
on context” (Mayer et al., 2013, p. 699).
Before assessing the impact of distributed leadership on the exercise of budget autonomy,
it is important to understand the elements that are in place in a distributed leadership
environment. After reviewing over 80 citations to look for common themes in the distributed
leadership, a team from the University of Gloucestershire identified four variables that indicate
the presence of distributed leadership (Bennett, Wise, Woods, & Harvey, 2003). These key
variables are control/autonomy, organizational structure and agency, social and cultural context,
and source of change (Bennett et al., 2003). Control/autonomy is evidenced by formal policy that
guides the actions of the organizations. Organizational structure can be demonstrated by changes
the system has made to support distributed leadership. The social context is important because
without internal cultural support, it is difficult for distributed leadership to be sustained. Finally,
the source of change impacts the viability of the move to distributed leadership because it can
provide enduring influence on senior leaders to sustain the commitment to distributed leadership.
Taken together, this framework will be useful to demonstrate an organization has distributed
leadership.
Applicability of distributed leadership to decentralization.
Distributed leadership may provide insight into why the implementation of budget
decentralization has been so limited. It offers a framework for understanding the key attributes
required for those asked to exercise additional decision-making authority outside their traditional
leadership roles (Harris, 2013). The leadership and management literature shows that stated
leaders, by virtue of their formal leadership roles, are important gatekeepers to organization
decision making and can actively encourage or limit other’s ability to take opportunities to lead
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innovation or change (Harris, 2013). If a district adopts the key criteria of distributed leadership,
then one could expect greater degrees of autonomy as formal leaders share their decision-making
responsibility and schools embrace their new authority (Harris, 2013; Spillane et al., 2001).
In the proceeding section, Bennett et al. (2003) described a test to identify the existence
of distributed leadership which can provide insight into the exercise of budget autonomy.
Distributed leadership, when applied to budget decentralization policies, can give principals the
freedom and expertise to exercise budget autonomy. While Strong & Yoshida (2014) agreed that
the principal is an essential actor in distributed leadership, Mayer et al. (2013) provided a
nuanced perspective that principals require some “protection” from district pressure for
immediate results in order to give some time for local school control in a decentralized
environment to flourish (p. 39). In other words, the principal’s success in creating an
environment that supports local control is not just dependent on their leadership style or
commitment, but also the level of support from the central office's formal leadership.
The distributed leadership literature also helps explain why, even if the policy environment is
right, some actors do not exercise this available flexibility (Honig & Rainey, 2012). The lens of
distributed leadership explains the preconditions for the success of a decentralization strategy.
Literature review conclusion.
While it is clear that district leaders pursue budget decentralization as a strategy to
improve school outcomes, the rate of adoption at the school-level is consistently lacking in the
literature (Bjork & Blase, 2009; Honig & Rainey, 2012). The literature defines two main
explanations for this poor record of implementation: lack of formal leadership at the senior levels
and lack of training at the local level. The support of the leadership is required to ensure an
autonomous environment is successful (Bjork & Blase, 2009; Greenlee, 2007). Additionally, the
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exercise of budget autonomy often does not occur because school communities are insufficiently
trained to handle the complex challenges associated with local management (Honig & Rainey,
2012; Lauber & Warden, 1999; Mayer & LeChasseur, 2013; Steinberg, 2014).
The literature of decentralization of authority paints a picture of a reform strategy that
had its success limited by the lack of execution at the school level (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998;
Honig & Rainey, 2012). The theoretical framework of distributed leadership provides useful
insight into budget autonomy because it argues that those outside of the traditional authority
structure will only act on a lever of power if they have the right set of conditions to take
ownership of that set of decisions (Harris, 2013). Advocates and detractors of budget
decentralization would benefit from a study that seeks to deepen the understanding of the
exercise of budget flexibility in an intentionally designed environment that meets the criteria of
distributed leadership. This insight into the degree to which schools exercise permitted autonomy
will inform the decentralization implementation efforts that are currently underway.
Additionally, this insight will aid in planning considerations for districts that are considering
expanding flexibility as a reform strategy.
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CHAPTER 2
A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF THE EXERCISE OF BUDGET AUTONOMY
The purpose of this study was to ascertain whether school principals exercise budget
flexibility when a district takes care to build an environment supportive of decentralization by
enacting key distributed leadership provisions. This study also investigated whether schools of
varying student achievement levels, operating in a distributed leadership environment, exercised
the ability to customize their budgets beyond the standard district allocation.
The distributed leadership theoretical framework provides a unique perspective into the
exercise of budget autonomy because it argues that the right set of conditions must be in place
for actors to take on non-traditional decision-making roles (Harris, 2013). This study provides
insight into the exercise of budget flexibility in an environment that meets the criteria of
distributed leadership. As budget autonomy grows in popularity, this insight will aid in planning
considerations for districts that are contemplating this type of flexibility as a reform strategy.
Research questions.
This study addresses a gap in the literature by discerning whether a district that has
created budget autonomy within a distributed leadership environment displays budget changes at
the school level. Based on the research of the critical features necessary for the exercise of
autonomy as well as the insight provided by distributed leadership theory, the following research
questions were created:
RQ1:

To what extent do schools exercise budget flexibility when it is provided in a
distributed leadership environment?

RQ2:

When provided with budget flexibility in a distributed leadership environment,
to what extent does the exercise of that autonomy vary by school performance?
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RQ3: When operating in a distributed leadership environment, to what extent are school
leaders more likely to change their budgets after they have been given budget
autonomy for multiple years?
Methodology.
This study sought to observe the execution of budget autonomy, which has been a
shortcoming of current decentralization efforts (Goertz & Stiefel, 1998; Honig & Rainey, 2012).
This study uses a quantitative methodology in order to capture whether or not school leaders
exercise budget autonomy as a reform strategy. This study will evaluate if the reform strategy is
actually affecting a change in school budgeting.
This study’s research questions call for a positivist approach that seeks to understand
behavior through a collection of observable facts by “recording measurements, describing
phenomena and performing experiments” (Cohen, 1982, p. 47). The data analyses isolated the
phenomena of school budget autonomy by observing whether school leaders, with the freedom to
alter their budget, chose to utilize their resources differently than the standard district central
office allocation. While a qualitative study can provide insight into the thought process of
principals and other stakeholders in their decision-making process, a quantitative study reveals
whether budget flexibility was actually executed. The lack of observation of actual behavior
change has been a shortcoming of the literature. For instance, in past studies examining
preference and intent principals overwhelmingly indicate a preference for budget autonomy
(Steinberg & Cox, 2017). Though perceptions of principals have been well-documented, in
practice, budget autonomy has not led to a change in decision-making (Honig & Rainey, 2012).
The first research question, to what extent do schools exercise budget flexibility, was
answered by comparing the district budget allocations alongside the principal’s budget

28

allocations (or decisions). This approach adds to the current research by recording the actual
dollar amounts and can be instructive to future decentralization efforts. Research on budget
decentralization tends to catalog the principal’s declared priority, not whether the principals
actually exercise the afforded flexibility to impact their school budget (Honig, 2012). One
example of this tendency was observed by Steinberg (2014) who found that principals supported
the notion of personal control over their budgets in the Chicago decentralization effort, yet
absent was an actual analysis of whether or not budget decentralization was exercised. Steinberg
noted that 82% of the schools who were afforded flexibility selected the “budget transfers”
option, which allowed the school to exercise spending control (Steinberg, 2014, p. 11). While the
Chicago study demonstrates a school leader’s interest in autonomy, the author did not analyze
whether their budget was actually impacted. This gap is commonly cited in Honig & Rainey’s
(2012) review of the literature on decentralization efforts.
To address the second research question, “to what extent does the exercise of that
autonomy vary by school performance?” the College Career-Readiness Performance Index
(CCRPI) was used to identify a school’s performance level. While simple test scores are one
gauge of achievement, CCRPI goes a step further by looking at multiple measures to assess
performance. The CCRPI is a comprehensive platform that considers school improvement,
accountability, and communication among educational stakeholders. CCRPI builds on the state
accountability test known as Georgia Milestones by looking at (a) test score growth and
achievement, (b) achievement gaps, and (c) readiness (Georgia Department of Education, 2017).
Readiness focuses on foundational skills, such as literacy, attendance, and enrichment beyond
the traditional core (Georgia Department of Education, 2017). As a state-mandated
accountability system, CCRPI provided reliable rankings for all schools in this study.
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This study included low and high achieving schools to compare whether they, on
average, adopted budget autonomy. Schools in the district were identified by their rank: low
performing and high performing, separated by the median performance. Median CCRPI scores
are reported statewide by school grade level: elementary, middle, and high school (Georgia
Department of Education, 2017). Some of the components of CCRPI vary by school grade level,
so separating schools by grade level ensured the study was not overly influenced by spending
allocations or decision from a group of schools with one particular grade level configuration.
Additionally, by employing the median CCRPI cut score as the classification line, more schools
were included in the study while still providing objective demarcation.
Georgia’s state accountability system, as measured by CCRPI, was used to rank school
performance because the CCRPI is more comprehensive. Other measures of success were
considered but discarded. For example, two common measures of success are reductions in
teacher turnover and the ten-point rating system released by GreatSchools.com. Teacher turnover
was dismissed as an inappropriate measure because this study is focused on principal decisionmaking. Additionally, there are a number of variables that impact turnover data because many
factors lead to attrition, beyond just school leadership and culture (Ingersoll, 2001). Though
Great Schools.com is an independent agency, GreatSchools.com was dismissed because CCRPI
is a more reliable indicator of school performance. GreatSchools.com is a leading nonprofit that
provides summary ratings of school performance. One challenge with the GreatSchool.com
rating system is that almost all of its rankings are based on raw test scores for ease of national
comparisons, which does not allow for local accountability (Strauss, 2017). CCRPI is a stateregulated tool that has a greater degree of rigor and is subject to oversight by the U.S.
Department of Education as a matter of law.

30

This study engaged distributed leadership theory as an analytical framework to provide
insight into the decision-making process of school principals. Distributed leadership helps
explain how formal and informal leadership roles contribute to organizational outcomes (Harris
& Spillane, 2008). While distributed leadership theory is often used to explain the relationship
between principal and teacher (Hairon & Goh, 2015), the same reporting relationship and power
dynamic exist between the central office and the school site (Mayer, Donaldson, LeChasseur,
Welton, & Cobb, 2013). From a distributed perspective, leadership is not just the function of one
particular group to another in a school district, but rather a set of activities leaders at all levels
engage in with others to achieve a specific task (Mayer et al., 2013). The literature on
distributive leadership argues that newly empowered leaders are more likely to embrace
autonomy when they are permitted to lead and given the training and support to take on this
additional body of work (McKenzie & Locke, 2014).
Validity and reliability.
Threats to validity and reliability cannot be erased, but there are important steps that can
reduce their influence over the study findings (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2013). Validity is
deﬁned as the extent to which a concept is accurately measured in a quantitative study (Cohen et
al., 2013). The budget allocation from the central office and the submitted school budget were
compared. These documents were readily available because an annual audit is carried out to
provide accurate measurements of how resources are allocated by the schools. The question is
whether changes in budget decisions at the school level correctly indicate the exercise of
decentralized decision-making.
To ensure construct validity, the principal’s actual budget of planned expenditures was
used. This is the budget that that was submitted into the district accounting system. Thus the
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central office’s allocation for the school becomes data set 1 and the school principal’s budget
becomes data set 2. While the specific motivation for a principal’s decision may or may not be
an embrace of the decentralization initiative, this final submission will capture whether or not
principals changed the budget allocations given to them by the central office.
Reliability in quantitative research concerns dependability, consistency, and replicability
over time (Cohen et al., 2013). Dependability assesses whether the processes of a study are
consistent over time (Cohen et al., 2013). For this study, the data collection and analysis were
standardized across each school. The budgets were allocated in a consistent fashion by the
central office according to a published resource guide, and the principals were obligated to
submit budget reports. Consequently, this study’s collection and reporting processes were
transparent and dependable. Consistency assesses whether the tools that propose to measure the
same general construct produce similar findings (Cohen et al., 2013). For this study, consistency
was established by the school’s allocation guide, which is a public document approved by the
SVCS school board and is the core of the budgeting process that is applied to each school across
the district. For research to be replicable, it must be demonstrated that if it were to be carried out
in a similar context, then the researcher would find similar results (Cohen et al., 2013).
Replicability exists because one common set of budget allocation formulas were consistently
applied to each school within the district. The data and formulas are available to other
researchers.
Research Design.
This study’s methodology, research questions, and conceptual framework were chosen to
reveal whether or not school building leaders took advantage of budget autonomy as a strategy.
The research questions addressed principals’ decision-making, considered levels of school
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performance, and time exposed to budget autonomy. Each research question required the
analysis of budget data: mainly the district central office budget allocation and the principal’s
actual budget for the school. School performance ranking as well as exposure (in years) to the
concept of budget autonomy were also analyzed. Additionally, other data elements were included
such as school level (elementary, middle, and high school), economic status, and enrollment
level.
To assess whether principals have modified their budget from the district allocation, this
study employed two separate tests: ANOVA single factor test of variance and a paired, twotailed t-test. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to analyze the differences among group
means in a sample (Bowen, 2016). The ANOVA will measure whether the mean level of budget
change varies by grade level. A paired t-test, sometimes called dependent sample t-test, is a
statistical procedure used to determine whether the mean difference between two sets of
observations is zero (Bowen, 2016). In a paired sample t-test, each subject or entity is measured
twice, resulting in pairs of observations. The first data set is the allocation from the district
central office. Given the flexibility provided by the decentralization policy, those funds are to be
budgeted as the school sees fit. In response, the second data set (the same money but as
expenditure) will measure whether the principal exercised budget autonomy.
While the ANOVA and t-test are uniquely well-suited to the research questions, several
other tests were considered from the literature. An independent t-test sample might have some
applicability, but the two data sets are related, so a paired approach is more appropriate (Bowen,
2016). This independent t-test is appropriate for RQ3 which examines unrelated schools by
performance level. A regression analysis might have been a good fit for predicting whether or
not future decentralizations will yield budget autonomy, but these research questions are focused
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on explaining current reform. A correlation study could have been useful in assessing the impact
of budget autonomy on school performance, but that value judgment is outside the scope of these
research questions. Finally, Steinberg (2014) pursued regression discontinuity to understand if
achievement improved past the point of discontinuity when budget autonomy was introduced.
Given that the stated research questions seek to identify changes in budgeting decisions, there is
no discontinuity threshold that would be suitable for this analysis.
This study seeks to determine if principals made significant changes to their district
budget allocation, so ANOVA and paired t-test are appropriate choices. A similar t-test was
performed in the Greenlee (2007) study of budget autonomy in Florida. Greenlee’s approach
allows for comparisons across a variety of schools while simultaneously using straight-forward
analytics to identify whether the two data sets have statistically significant differences in their
means.
One consideration in the application of both the t-tests and ANOVA is to ensure they are
appropriate tests to analyze the given data set, which in this case is the school budget data from
SVCS. These tests do require an assumption of normality. ANOVA is typically robust to
deviations from normality when more than 30 participants are involved (Field, 2013). After
reviewing the histograms of the data sets, the distributions have apparent normality, which
permits the use of the t-test and ANOVA. However, to reinforce this visual interpretation, the
Shapiro-Wilk test was also applied to each data set in these analyses. The Shapiro-Wilk test can
be used to determine if a distribution differs significantly from a normal distribution, particularly
in small samples (Field, 2013).
A Shapiro-Wilk statistic was generated for each of the four budget categories (NonPersonnel, Support, Paraprofessionals, and Total Teacher) by school level (Elementary, Middle,
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and High). The normality testing indicates a normal or near-normal distribution for most of the
categories by level, with the exception of Paraprofessionals for all levels, and Total Teacher for
the Elementary level. To ensure those ANOVA and paired t-test findings are supported, a nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis or Wilcoxon signed-rank test was performed on each category by
level that shows a significant departure from the normal distribution. Those tests results are
captured in Appendix C and D. In all cases, the non-parametric test results agree and support the
ANOVA and paired t-test results.
The paired t-test and ANOVA can be substantially influenced by the presence of outlier
data points. If only one school exercised autonomy but the comparisons of means tests were
statistically significantly different, the interpretation of a finding of significance might be
technically accurate, but practically misleading since the extent of exercise across the school
district might actually be quite small. When examining the number of data points at least one
standard deviation from the mean, it became clear that one outlier was not triggering a technical
finding of significant difference of the means. In appendix B, the number of schools who
reallocated their budget by more than one standard deviation from the mean are listed. After
reviewing the data, the mean does not appear to be impacted by any single extreme outliers since
generally 20 percent of the observations are at least one standard deviation from the mean. This
question of data normality is addressed and answered in more detail in Appendices C and D.
Another aspect to consider in the application of these tests of comparisons of means is the
application to the entire population of data, rather than to just a randomly selected sample. Even
though this data set is a census of one budget year, the 2016-17 data set is just a sample of a
larger population of budget choices by SVCS school leaders over time. Treating a data set as a
sample from one moment in time can inform predictions about future cases (Gelman, 2009). The
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analysis of the 2016-17 census was used to make inferences about the extent of the exercise of
budget autonomy by schools in SVCS, which is the goal of RQ1.
The dependent variable is the change in spending priorities as evidenced by the actual
school budget after schools have had an opportunity to exercise flexibility. The dependent
variable tests whether the budget allocation chosen varies from the original allocation. This study
set out to analyze Spring Valley County Schools’ (SVCS) four main budget groupings: (a)
personnel, (b) non-personnel, (c) special-programs personnel, and (d) special programs-non
personnel. The grouping domains provided by the state and used by the district in their training
manuals differed slightly from the groupings used in the budget actually submitted into the
accounting system, but the underlying budget lines were the same. Given the groupings entered
into the budget system were more detailed, this study employed the set of domains that the
district actually entered into the budget system. A brief recap is here:
Table 1
Lists of Budget Categories at SVCS 2016-17
Domains Used in SVCS Training Literature
Personnel
Non-personnel
Special-programs personnel
Special programs-non personnel

Domains Used in Budget Worksheets
Total Teachers
Paraprofessionals
Support personnel
Non personnel

This study analyzed SVCS’s four operational budget category groupings: (a) teachers, (b)
paraprofessionals, (c) support personnel, and (d) non personnel. The total school level
expenditure for SVCS in 2016-17 was $641,756,851. Within each of the four domains, the
dependent variable was the change in the principal expenditure, as measured by the percent of
the budget spent on that category. The independent variable, or explanatory variable, is the
exercise of budget flexibility at the school level. The four independent variables were measured
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by determining whether the created budget is statistically different from the district’s original
allocation by employing a dependent samples t-test.
Since funds are distributed to schools in dollars based on enrollment, comparing total
dollars across schools could skew any comparison because of the variability of enrollment
counts. Similar to Greenlee (2007), this study elected to use percentages by budget line to allow
for comparison across schools to permit comparison across schools. If only actual dollars were
used, schools with larger enrollment could skew the analysis suggesting autonomy was more
widespread than in actual practice. This calculation was completed by using the following
formula where 𝐴1 is the district allocation for a budget domain and 𝐴2 is the principal selected
budget for that domain:
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 =

(𝐴1 −𝐴2 )
𝐴1

Selection of district.
To investigate the impact of decentralization on principal behavior, this study
investigated one Georgia district that has formalized a Charter System contract. This school
district will be known as Spring Valley County Schools for the purposes of this study. In 2012,
Spring Valley County Schools (SVCS) entered into a contract with the State of Georgia to
become a charter system. By joining the charter system, SVCS made an explicit commitment to
budget autonomy and formally moved budgetary decision-making from the central office to the
school site.
To assess the appropriateness of SVCS for this study, it is necessary to establish whether
SVCS has built an environment that supports budget decentralization. To demonstrate a
commitment to budget decentralization, Bennet et al. (2003) identified four useful criteria to
identify the existence of distributed leadership in a school district setting. These key variables are
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control/autonomy, organizational structure and agency, social and cultural context, and source of
change (Bennett et al., 2003). In the proceeding paragraphs, SVCS will be assessed according to
these criteria.
The first criteria is control/autonomy which is evidenced by formal policy that guides the
actions of the organizations. SVCS has demonstrated a commitment to local control and school
level autonomy in the management of school resources. The principles of transparency are
documented in the School Allotment Guidelines, which specifies how resources are distributed
to each school. SVCS publishes this guide annually to create a predictable distribution of funds.
As stated in the opening section of the document:
Each principal is fully empowered through a budgeting process that provides reasonable
flexibility, high accountability, innovation, and results-driven budget recommendations
aligned with each school’s strategic plan and the district’s overall mission. (p.3)
In addition, schools are also afforded flexibility to allocate non-personnel funds as they
see fit. The Allotment Guide encourages each principal to use this flexibility to “allocate these
non-personnel funds to various programs and accounts based on each school’s needs” (p. 4).
The district should also be of sufficient size to necessitate the existence of a central office.
Finally, the district should have a transparent budgeting process to objectively measure budget
decisions. Each of these filters will be discussed.
The second criteria is the existence of the organization structure to support budget
decentralization. The district must have an explicit commitment to decentralization that defines
the role of leaders at all levels of the district (Harris, 2013). SVCS’s organizational structure
satisfies this criterion because they have completed the transition to a decentralized operating
model under the Charter System Act. A Charter System is a school district that has a
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performance contract with the State Board of Education granting freedom from most of state
education code in exchange for a commitment to meet firm accountability targets (Georgia
Department of Education, 2017). In its application, SVCS commits to providing schools with
authority to build budgets that align specifically with “each school’s improvement plan” (p. 47).
The third criteria is the social context of the increase in autonomy which is important
because without internal cultural support, it is difficult for distributed leadership to be sustained.
Scholars agree a key limitation of budget decentralization implementation is that schools are
insufficiently trained to handle the complex challenges associated with local management (Honig
& Rainey, 2012; Lauber & Warden, 1999; Mayer & LeChasseur, 2013; Steinberg, 2014). As a
result of the school board’s decision to become a charter system, SVCS invested in a culture to
ensure decentralization would be a priority for schools (Samuels, 2012). SVCS has prioritized
the development of professional development of staff to prepare to succeed in this new
environment.
Finally, the fourth criteria, the source of change, influences the degree to which
distributed leadership is a part of the organization. The impetus of the move to distributed
leadership exerts significant influence on its viability in the organization (Bennett, 2003). In the
case of SVCS, the school board drove the organization, after taking substantial comment from
the community, to enter into a Charter System Contract to formalize decentralization. The source
of the change in SVCS originated from the most senior levels of the organization which suggests
its ramifications will be felt through the school district.
In addition to the presence of distributed leadership, SVCS possesses the requisite size to
analyze the exercise of budget autonomy. The complete sample of 94 SVCS traditional public
schools provides adequate observations to provide the degrees of freedom to enable the use of
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ANOVA and the paired sample t-test. This quantitative approach requires a detailed data set that
is similar in size and scope to complete the ANOVA and the t-test calculations (Bowen, 2016).
Additionally, SVCS has significant scale to warrant a central office with a team of professionals
that calculates and manages budget allocations for the entire district.
Finally, SVCS has a unique level of transparency to permit the analysis of budget
autonomy. The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) established the Certificate of
Achievement for Excellence in Financial Reporting Program (CAFR Program) to encourage and
recognize local governments that go beyond the minimum requirements of generally accepted
accounting principles to demonstrate transparency and full disclosure (Government Finance
Officers Association, 2018). Only 13 school districts in Georgia have earned this highest level of
achievement in 2016. Of those 13, only five had been operating as a charter system in 2016. Of
those five systems that have demonstrated transparency and exemplary disclosure, only SVCS
publishes a school allotment guide that documents allocation each school receives at the
beginning of the budget cycle. This document details the district’s budget allocation guide which
provides a further degree of transparency that separates SVCS from the other charter systems in
the state of Georgia.
This commitment to policy and practice makes SVCS an appropriate choice for this
secondary data analysis and presents a unique opportunity to observe principal decision-making
in a distributed leadership environment. SVCS was the district investigated to answer these
research questions because of its explicit commitment to budget autonomy and its execution of a
charter system contract with the Georgia Department of Education.
Data selection.
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This study analyzed SVCS’s four operational budget category groupings: (a) teachers, (b)
paraprofessionals, (c) support personnel, and (d) non personnel. As discussed earlier, these
categories are used by the finance division of SVCS and provide a representative approach to
categorizing the total spending by SVCS schools. The underlying budget categories are
consistent with the State of Georgia’s Department of Education finance structure.
Performance levels bands were defined by the CCRPI single score for 2016-17. To create
a categorical variable and to lessen the burden on the precision of CCRPI, schools that scored
below the district median were low-performing and schools that scored above were highperforming. Since the State accountability calculations are different for each grade level of
school, schools were sorted by the median score for the school level. Elementary schools median
single CCRPI score was 78.2, the middle school median score was 71.1, and the high school
median score was 80.5 (GOSA, 2017).
This study abided by the District budget categorization because this taxonomy is applied
consistently across all schools in district data. This approach comprehensively covers all stateallocated funding streams and is mutually exclusive so there is no overlap between the categories
which might impact data accuracy.
Data Collection.
As publicly funded institutions, school districts are subject to the Georgia Open Records
Act which affirms “public access to public records should be encouraged to foster confidence in
government and so that the public can evaluate the expenditure of public funds” (Open Records
Act, 2012, p.1). This information includes key documents such as school-level budgets. The
request that was sent to the dedicated district Open Records office was on the materials
principals received in the preparation of their school-level budget for the 2016-17 school year.
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Including specifically:
•

The budget development template for each school which includes the allocation by
budget line.

•

The enrollment projections that led to those allocations for each school. I suspect this
is already included in the budget development template.

•

The actual budget approved by the School Governance Council and submitted into
the district budget system.

Open Record laws require a three business day turnaround with an estimate of how long
it will take to return the data (Open Records, 2012). Within that timeframe the district produced
five files to answer the request. The district generated by line budget data from the 2016-17
school year for elementary schools, middle schools, high schools, and charter schools.
Additionally, the district produced an enrollment report for 2016-17. The three budget files
which became the basis of this analysis totaled 550 pages. When converted from their pdf file
format into Excel, there were approximately 15,000 lines of data.
Additionally, SVCS publishes the district’s School Allotment Guidelines annually and
distributes them to the appropriate stakeholders. The school allotment guides lay out the
distribution of resources according to formulas that are driven by actual school-level enrollment.
The Allotment guide is at the heart of the budgeting process because it lays out how resources
are distributed to schools. Only enrollment drives these allocations, as the guide is clear that “all
formulas used in allotments are applied the same way to all schools regardless of a school’s Title
I status, Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015” (p.3). This document is approved at a public
school board meeting and published on the district website.
Sample size.
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To provide the maximum degrees of freedom and improve the quality of the findings, all
94 SVCS school budgets were included in this study from the 2016-17 school year. Even though
this data set is a census of one budget year, the 2016-17 data set is just a sample of a larger
population of budget choices by SVCS school leaders over time. Treating a data set as a sample
from one moment in time can inform predictions about future cases (Gelman, 2009).
These schools receive the same central office communication and operate under standard
district policies. While informal communications may differ, the policy of the district is
ultimately governed by its formal documents that are approved by the Board of Education. Both
the Allotment Guidelines and the School Autonomy Guidebook are developed by district
leadership and approved by the School Board during open session of a public board meeting. The
SVCS budget office communicates consistent information to all schools with no regard for
performance. All budget data was gathered through an open records requests to give district
budget officials an opportunity to verify the accuracy of those records before they are released
for analysis (Open Records Act, 2012).
There were several important exclusions from this data set. The first, and perhaps more
substantial, exclusion were district-authorized charter schools. There were nine districtauthorized charters in SVCS in 2016-17 served about 4,000 kids or about 4% of the total SVCS
student population. Charter schools were excluded because this study seeks to measure the
exercise of the introduction of budget flexibility which is at the core of the construction of a
charter school in Georgia. The Georgia Department of Education is clear that autonomy and
flexibility are the main distinguishing elements between charter schools and traditional public
schools (Georgia Department of Education, 2019). Charter schools have no initial guidance
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from a district budget allocation so the study would not be able to identify the exercise of
autonomy from the district’s decentralization initiative.
Additionally, independent charter schools are not beholden to any central office budget
accountability. There are no district-mandated staffing ratios, curricular decisions, or
instructional investments that could guide or constrain their decision-making, so the presence of
the district’s decentralization initiative of 2012 would not create an inflection point for charter
leader behavior. Since there is no baseline of centralization for purposes of comparison,
independent charter schools were excluded from this study to focus on the impact of the
decentralization reform on principal behavior.
SVCS launched a virtual school in 2016-17 and that was also excluded from this analysis.
The virtual school was in a planning year and had no students or teachers assigned to it in this
planning year. All $1.8 million allocated was not recorded as spent during the 2016-17 budget
cycle so it did not provide a useful basis for analysis. A college and career academy was also
launched in 2016-17. This was a planning year and no students were reported to be enrolled so it
was excluded from this analysis.
Another exception was A Elementary School because the school’s budget was not
balanced, in other words, the district invested additional dollars for some special programs which
the school did not implement. Of the 95 schools in SVCS, A Elementary was the only school that
was excluded from the analysis. If it was included, the lack of spending of the extra allocation
from the district could be construed as an affirmative action from the principal, but given the
school was not permitted to reallocate those funds for other purposes, it would be misleading to
assume this absence of spending was an example of budget autonomy. Since the principal was
not permitted to reallocate these funds, there is no evidence the principal chose one investment
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over another. The impact of this exclusion will be small since A Elementary is one of the
smallest elementary schools in the district with an enrollment of 593 which represents about
0.6% of district enrollment.
Data analysis.
The analysis to identify the exercise of budget flexibility was done by comparing the
district allocation to the budget actually created by the school. The SVCS School Allotment
Guidelines identify hundreds of separate budget lines that schools can transfer funds between at
their discretion. To allow for ease of comparison, this study employed the consolidation
approach used by SVCS finance staff to group the hundreds of different line items into four
comprehensive budget categories: total teachers, paraprofessionals, support staff, and nonpersonnel.
Each of the four categories has a consistent interpretation that are all coded by the district
budget office. These categories are comprehensive of the school budget and mutually exclusive
so each allocation only appears in one category. The category of “teachers” includes any teacher
of record who is directly responsible for educating children, which includes traditional core
subjects, electives, special education, and career and technical educators. Examples of these
types of teachers in core tested subjects in elementary and middle school are: mathematics,
science, English language arts, and social studies. The category of paraprofessional includes the
allocations for non-certified staff that are assigned to specific classrooms. The category of
“support” includes all other adults in the school house that are not teachers of record.
Specifically, this category includes the principal, assistant principal, office assistants, counselors,
nurse, security offices, custodians, and other support personnel. The “non personnel” category
includes all portions of the budget that are not personnel-related including office supplies, library
orders, materials, copier fees and maintenance, in-system travel, and postage.
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Although the Open Records request specified the data to be returned in Excel format,
their budget system was only able to generate portable document format (pdf) which allows for
easier file transfer, but is difficult to analyze.
Software call PDF Converter permitted the conversion to Excel. One of the unfortunate
byproducts of pdf conversion is much of the original formatting was lost from the original
district presentation. Specifically, columns were misaligned and all internal calculations are
replaced with static numbers. Before proceeding with the data analysis, these data sets were
reconstituted and reformatted to permit computation and analysis. As part of this process,
subtotals were manually verified to ensure no error was introduced. Also, the total for each
school was checked and finally, the overall total of $641,756 of school-level budget spend was
reviewed and verified. After that data was in a usable format, summary tables organized by key
budget categories were created that included key descriptive fields. Those specific areas are
grade level, enrollment, and CCRPI single score from the state accountability system. Each of
those will be described in detail. Although the formatting was done in Excel, the more
sophisticated calculations were completed in IBM SPSS Statistics version 26.
The goal of the first research question is to assess the extent to which schools exercise the
budget flexibility provided to them by the school district. To answer the first research question,
this study of SVCS first investigated the number of schools that exercised budget flexibility in
the fiscal year 2017, three years after all schools were required to adopt charter system practices
(Walker, 2016). The district adopted a three-year phased-in approach in three cohorts, so 2016
was the first year of complete data. For this study, only 2016-17 data was used because the
district’s senior administration changed in June 2016 and the focus on decentralization was de-
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emphasized during the transition. A new five-year strategic plan was launched in the summer of
2017 and references to budget autonomy or flexibility had been removed.
The first descriptive indicator is grade level. At SVCS, there are three grade levels:
elementary, middle and high school. SVCS Elementary schools span from preschool to fifth
grade. Middle schools serve students sixth to eighth grade. High schools serve students in ninth
through twelfth-grade graduation. This indicator is important because of differences in budget
allocation and resource base of grade levels.
The next descriptive indicator that is included in this data set is enrollment. Since
enrollment is the key driver of absolute dollars allocated to a school, it will be necessary to track
the size of each school to permit relative analyses. This data was provided for the study as part of
the district response to the Open Records request. The final descriptive data element is CCRPI
which was described in detail in the research design section of this study. The data is provided
for each school and is available on the Georgia Department of Education’s website.
The next analytical step was to understand if spending allocations varied by school level.
The district allocation guide is divided into grade-level band of elementary, middle and high.
These three grade-level bands made up the groupings of the first analysis. If all 94 schools were
combined into one analysis and there are core differences among the allocations, the differences
in allocations could distort the findings because principals have different sized budgets based on
school enrollment. Larger schools with bigger budgets, such as high schools, could mask effects
at schools with lower student counts so it was necessary to look at percent budget change for
each budget domain. ANOVA is a useful test to compare the means of multiple sets data. In this
case, the data sets analyzed were the allocation percentage changes for each budget domain.
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ANOVA was performed for all four categories to ascertain whether percentage
differences vary by grade level. If there is a finding of statistical significance between the groups
as a whole, the Tukey post hoc test was applied to identify where the difference lies between the
groups. Once it was determined that there are differences amongst grade levels, then it was
necessary to isolate those differences. The two-tailed t-test demonstrates whether two data sets
are statistically different (Pallant, 2013). The first data set is the formula-driven resource
allocation from the district for each school. The second data set is the actual budget approved by
each school for each of the four budget categories. The descriptive attributes of this data set are
detailed in Appendix A.
In summary, the variables are identified in Table 2.
Table 2
Variable Identifiers
District Budget Category
Teacher
Paraprofessionals
Support
Non personnel

District Allocation
𝐴1
𝐵1
𝐶1
𝐷1

Principal-Created Budget
𝐴2
𝐵2
𝐶2
𝐷2

For the ANOVA analyses which measure budget changes across categories, the
dependent variable is the percentage change in budget allocation. For the paired t-tests which are
applied within budget categories, the dependent variable is the change in budget allocation. In
both cases, there is a separate independent variable and dependent variable for each category to
assess whether budget flexibility has been exercised for that specific budget grouping. In total,
there were four dependent and four independent variables aligning to each of the SVCS budget
groupings for each analysis. If the hypothesis that the means are different is rejected, then the
average school in the district would not have exercised flexibility for that budget category. In
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addition, each school was analyzed to see how many changed their budget by one standard
deviation from the mean which is captured in Appendix B.
To complete these calculations, the first analysis was to identify the means of each data
set. The mean is the arithmetic average of all values in a data distribution which is the average of
all of the numbers in the data set (Bowen, 2006).
𝑋̅ =

𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 (𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒) =

∑𝑋
𝑁

𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 (𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑡

The variable 𝑋 was the mean of the allocation for each budget category. The variable 𝑁
represents the number of schools in this analysis.
ANOVA tests the equality of these group means by partitioning variances to different
sources.
Mean Squares Formula
𝑀𝑆𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 =
𝑀𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 =

𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛
𝑑𝑓𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛
𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛
𝑑𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛

F Formula
𝐹 =

𝑀𝑆𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛
𝑀𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛

The F statistic is the value from the ANOVA test used to find out if the means between
two populations are significantly different. The F statistic is used to decide to support or reject
the null hypothesis. If the calculated F value in a test is larger than the F statistic, the null
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hypothesis is rejected. The p-value is determined by the F statistic and is the probability that the
results could have happened by chance (Bowen, 2016).
The paired samples t-test compares two observations of a variable in order to determine
whether there is statistical evidence that the associated population means are significantly
different. The formula for the paired t-test is:

The variable S is the sample standard deviation defined by:

The hypotheses of these analyses are designed to test whether the mean budget allocation
from the district is changed overall when examining the school approved budget. This indicates
mean total changes in a budget flexibility environment. The null hypothesis of the ANOVA test
for the first research question is that the means of the three sets are the same so, on average, there
is no exercise of budget autonomy for SVCS. The alternative hypothesis is that the means are not
the same therefore budget autonomy has been exercised by some of the schools in the category.
This analysis design does not place a value on the exercise of budget autonomy. This lack of
exercise of autonomy may have occurred because the district allocation met the needs of the
average school. The motivation for the lack of exercise of autonomy is beyond the scope of these
research questions which are designed to understand if budget autonomy is exercised at SVCS
after the decentralization initiative was fully implemented.
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The second research question of this dissertation tests whether the exercise of budget
autonomy varies by a dichotomized representation of school performance. For RQ2, the data set
is divided into two groups by the characteristic of performance. To answer this question, a
paired t-test is most appropriate. This is the same test as in RQ1, though in this case the analysis
is applied to grouping of schools sorted by performance rather than just by school level. To
reflect the differences in calculations of CCRPI by grade level, separate medians are calculated
for each grade level at SVCS to create two bands of schools: high-performing and lowperforming.
The null hypothesis for low-performing schools is that the means of both sets of budget
expenditure data are the same. Hence, low-performing schools would not indicate evidence
regarding mean changes in District allocations to mean school budgets. A finding of lack of
implementation for low-performing schools would suggest that even in a distributed leadership
environment, decentralization may not be an appropriate reform strategy for low-performing
schools as it is currently constructed in SVCS. If the means are statistically different, lowperforming schools in SVCS have shown evidence of a mean change in district allocation to
school approved budget. Schools across performance bands are not compared to each other,
rather the means changes for low-performing and high-performing schools are calculated
independently to assess the change for each grouping.
For high-performing schools, the null hypothesis is that means are the same which would
indicate that the average high-performing school in SVCS has not exercised budget autonomy.
The alternative hypothesis is that means of both sets of budget expenditure data are statistically
different. Therefore, the average high-performing school has exercised budget autonomy and
thus the null hypothesis is rejected.
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RQ3 investigates whether the incidence of autonomy varies by the amount of time that
schools have operated in the charter system and were permitted to exercise budget autonomy. As
part of the Charter System contract with the State of Georgia, the district committed to a phased
implementation of the budget flexibility afforded to school principals. This phase-in occurred
over three years with the last cohort with the opportunity to exercise flexibility in 2016-17. Since
the sample size is unequal when comparing the three implementation cohorts, it is necessary to
ensure that there is homogeneity of variance to be able to apply ANOVA (Bowen, 2016).
Levene’s test demonstrates that the variances are equal since p value > α, which in this case is
0.05.
Since SVCS is a growing system, schools were opened during the years of this phased
implementation. Two schools fell into this category – elementary school B and elementary
school C. The district leadership assigned these schools to Cohort 3 which was reflected in this
analysis.
Results.
The purpose of the present study was to assess whether principals exercise budget
authority in a district that has a distributed leadership environment. Using actual budget data
from a large urban/suburban school district from the 2016-17 school year as its outcome
variable, the study employed a quantitative analysis to capture principal budget decisions.
This study employed a similar approach as Greenlee (2007) to employ quantitative analysis to
assess whether principal budgetary decisions significantly differed from the standard allocations
provided by the district central office. Specifically, the results of ANOVA and then t-tests were
used to demonstrate whether mean school-level budget decisions differed from the mean district
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allocations. Each of the 94 schools in SVCS was included in the calculation to derive the mean
spending amounts for each of the specific research questions.
To answer RQ1, the means of the four budget groups were investigated to assess whether
the district allocations were statistically different from the average budget decisions at the
schools. To address RQ2, this analysis was also performed for means of low-performing and
high-performing schools to determine if the average school-level decision differs from the
district allocation. To address RQ3, the amount of time school operate with budget autonomy is
analyzed at the school level. Since there were three cohorts of data, ANOVA was the best test to
see if means vary for at least one of the four budget categories. All 94 traditional schools were
included in this analysis. They were coded by year that they had the ability to implement their
budget autonomy. Table 3 from the school district demonstrates the pace and cadence of the
autonomies granted to schools by cohort.
Table 3
Budget Decentralization Implementation Schedule

(Charter System Planning Document, 2013)
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Hypothesis.
The null hypothesis was that there is no relationship between the independent variable
and change in budget allocation. Therefore, the average Spring Valley County School (SVCS)
did not opt to build a different budget than the district allocation. A school-level analysis was
also considered to assess the number of schools that are impacting the overall average. As a
reminder, a rejection of this hypothesis means SVCS is experiencing the exercise of autonomy
which runs counter to the research. Though the evidence from this analysis would not
demonstrate a causal relationship, if budget autonomy is exercised, the role of the district’s
investment in distributed leadership would warrant further investigation.
The first analysis grouped each schools spending into four distinct budget categories and
then calculated the average amount of spending per budget category. Table 4 displays a
descriptive summary of all 94 schools at SVCS:

Table 4
Average Expenditures by Budget Category for all schools (n=94)
Budget Category

Average of Earned
Percent of School Budget

Teachers Total
Support
Paraprofessionals
Non Personnel
Total

69.43%
18.95%
5.00%
6.63%
100%

Average of Allocated
Percent of School
Budget
69.35%
19.72%
5.17%
5.76%
100%

Average Increase
(Decrease)
(0.08%)
0.77%
0.18%
(0.87%)

Taken from the districtwide perspective, there were changes in every budget category.
The general reduction in non personnel expenditure was the greatest percentage change. One risk
of calculating only districtwide changes is the possibility that there were changes in both
additions and subtractions that may be canceling each other out which may mitigate some of the
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findings. Given the differences in the allocation between elementary, middle and high schools,
the next analysis was to review the same average allocations by school level.
Table 5
Average Expenditures by Budget Category for Elementary Schools (n=58)
Budget Category

Average of Earned %
of School Budget

Average of Used %
of School Budget

Average Increase
(Decrease)

Teachers Total
Support
Paraprofessionals
Non Personnel
Total

69.18%
17.87%
6.66%
6.28%
100%

69.53%
18.34%
6.91%
5.22%
100%

0.35%
0.46%
0.24%
(1.06%)

At the elementary school level, the general reduction in non-personnel reallocation
matches the districtwide trend. However, unlike the other grade levels, the average elementary
school slightly increased its spending on teacher total spending.

Table 6
Average Expenditures by Budget Category for Middle Schools (n=19)
Budget Category

Teachers Total
Support
Paraprofessionals
Non Personnel
Total

Average of
Earned % of
School Budget

Average of Used %
of School Budget

Average Increase
(Decrease)

74.94%
17.48%
1.95%
5.63%
100.00%

73.83%
18.83%
2.12%
5.22%
100.00%

(1.11%)
1.34%
0.17%
(0.41%)

Middle school principals, on average, shifted spending to fund the support personnel
budget category. This increase was funded by a reallocation from non personnel spending and
spending on teachers. High school principals, on average, had the most pronounced spending
shift. Each budget category was reduced to drive spending increases in the support personnel
category. Besides relatively modest adjustments to average paraprofessional allocations, middle
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school and high school spending patterns are directionally aligned, resources were reallocated
away from non personnel toward support spending.
Table 7
Average Expenditures by Budget Category for High Schools (n=17)
Budget Category

Teachers Total
Support
Paraprofessionals
Non Personnel
Total

Average of
Earned % of
School Budget

Average of Used %
of School Budget

Average Increase
(Decrease)

64.13%
24.24%
2.71%
8.93%
100.00%

63.71%
25.43%
2.66%
8.19%
100.00%

(0.42%)
1.19%
(0.05%)
(0.73%)

While total spending on teachers and paraprofessionals was mixed across the three levels
of schools, at each level the average spending by principals on support personnel increased and
the average spending on non personnel decreased. The average spending by principals on support
personnel increased at each level but was most pronounced at the secondary level where it
increased by about 1.25%. Given the average secondary school budget is over $9.3 million, this
change represents about $100,000 per school.
Research question one.
RQ1 examines to what extent do schools exercise budget flexibility when it is provided in
a distributed leadership environment. The first level of analysis is a descriptive calculation of the
absolute value of percent budget change by budget category. Across all grade levels, more than
8.0 percent of school budgets changed on average according to Table 8 below. These changes
were concentrated largely in non personnel. As Tables 5, 6 and 7 clarify, these changes were
consistently reductions in non-personnel expenditure. From Table 8 it is shown the change in
non personnel averaged about 20 percent across all schools. By far the least amount of change

56

occurred in the total amount spent on teachers, which averaged less than 1.5% change in budget
allocations when principals were free to allocate their funds. The weighted average is based on
the actual school level allocations described in Table 4.
Table 8
Mean of Absolute Value of Average Percent Change by Budget Category (n=94)
Budget Categories

Elementary
Schools

Middle
Schools

High
Schools

Average
Across Levels

Teachers Total

0.81%

2.28%

2.70%

1.45%

Support

5.68%

9.21%

5.96%

6.44%

Paraprofessionals

4.13%

11.58%

7.13%

6.18%

Non Personnel

21.67%

20.28%

17.79%

20.69%

Weighted Average

3.14%

5.16%

4.44%

3.79%

To deepen the understanding of the extent that principals exercised mean budget
flexibility, it is helpful to examine whether principals at different grade levels exercise mean
flexibility differently from each other. To conduct this analysis, the study employed ANOVA’s
for each of the four budget categories. One-way ANOVA is used to test the null hypothesis that
the means of several populations, composed of different grade levels, are all equal. Rejecting the
null hypothesis would indicate that spending allocations, on average, differ by grade level. To
allow for comparisons across schools of vastly different sizes, those amounts were converted to
percentages and the absolute value of those changes were calculated. If variances were
determined to be unequal from Levene’s test, then Welch’s test would be appropriate for
comparing means when there is not homogeneity of variance in the data.
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Table 9
Teacher Total: Budget Percent Difference by School Level (n=94)
Groups
Elementary Schools
Middle Schools
High Schools
Total

N
58
19
17
94

Mean
0.81%
2.28%
2.70%
1.45%

SD
1.15%
0.43%
0.38%
1.61%

SE
0.15%
0.43%
0.38%
0.17%

Table 10
Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variances for Teacher Total: Budget Percent Difference by
School Level
Levene’s Statistic
4.877

Df1
2

Df2
91

Sig.
0.01

The p-value of the Levene’s test is 0.01 which is less than 0.05 so the variances are
unequal. Since one-way ANOVA assumes homogeneity of variances, it is necessary to use
Welch's ANOVA to compares three means to see if there is a statistically significant difference
among the means when the data violates the assumption of homogeneity of variances. In SPSS,
the Welch tests output is:
Table 11
Welch ANOVA for Teacher Total: Budget Percent Difference by School Level
Welch Statistic
14.07

Df1
2

Df2
28.326

Sig.
0.00

The Welch output is significant at the 0.05 level so since p < 0.05, there are statistically
significant differences among one or more of the school level groupings. Since the assumption
of homogeneity of variance was not met for this data, Welch’s adjusted F ratio (14.07) was used,
which was significant at the .05 alpha level (p shown as .000, that is p < .05), so it can be
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concluded that at least one of the three school levels differ significantly on their average percent
change. Post hoc follow-up procedures (e.g., Games-Howell) were conducted to test the
difference between all unique pairwise comparisons. The Games-Howell test is required to
identify the source of the variance. Since the Games-Howell test does not rely on equal
variances and sample sizes, it is often recommended over other post hoc approaches such as
Tukey's test (Field, 2013).
Table 12
Games-Howell Teacher Total: Budget Percent Difference by School Level (n=94)

Elementary School

High School
Middle School

High School
Middle School

Elementary School

-1.89%*

0.40%

.000

-1.47%

*

0.45%

.011

-1.89%

*

0.40%

.000

Middle School

0.42%

0.57%

.745

Elementary School

1.47%*

0.45%

.011

High School

-0.42%

0.57%

.745

*p < .05

There was a statistically significant difference between groups as determined by Welch’s
test (F = 14.15, p = 0.00). The Welch test indicates which of the budget changes from Table 9
were statistically significant. A Games-Howell post hoc test revealed that the average change in
elementary principals’ budget allocation (0.81%) was statistically significantly lower than
middle school principals (2.28%) and high school principals (2.70%). There was no statistically
significant difference between middle and high school principals (p = 0.745).
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Table 13
Paraprofessionals Total: Budget Percent Difference by School Level (n=94)
Groups
Elementary Schools
Middle Schools
High Schools
Total

N
58
19
17
94

Mean
4.13%
11.58%
7.13%
6.18%

SD
6.05%
24.66%
12.40%
13.23%

SE
0.79%
5.66%
3.01%
1.37%

Table 14
Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variances for Paraprofessional Total: Budget Percent
Difference by School Level
Levene’s Statistic
10.58

Df1
2

Df2
91

Sig.
0.00

The p-value of the Levene’s test is < 0.05 so it is assumed the variances are unequal.
Since one-way ANOVA assumes homogeneity of variances, it is necessary to use Welch's
ANOVA to compares three means to see if they are equal when the data violates the assumption
of homogeneity of variances. In SPSS, the Welch’s output is:
Table 15
Welch ANOVA for Paraprofessional: Budget Percent Difference by School Level
Welch Statistic
1.24

Df1
2

Df2
24.59

Sig.
0.31

The Welch output is not significant at the 0.05 level. Since p = 0.31, there are not
significant differences between the three school level groupings. Since the assumption of
homogeneity of variance was not met for this data, Welch’s adjusted F ratio (1.24) was used,
which was not significant at the .05 alpha level (p =0.31), so it can be concluded that average
percent change of paraprofessional spending does not differ significantly by school level. Since
there was no statistically significant difference observed, no post hoc analysis was done. Though
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there were spending differences on paraprofessionals, these differences were not statistically
significant among the groups.
Table 16
Support Total: Budget Percent Difference by School Level (n=94)
Groups
Elementary Schools
Middle Schools
High Schools
Total

N
58
19
17
94

Mean
5.68%
9.21%
5.96%
6.44%

SD
3.95%
6.40%
3.04%
4.59%

SE
0.51%
1.47%
0.74%
0.47%

Table 17
Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variances for Support Total: Budget Percent Difference by
School Level
Levene’s Statistic
6.17

Df1
2

Df2
91

Sig.
0.03

The p-value of the Levene’s test is 0.03 which is less than 0.05 so the variances are
unequal. Since one-way ANOVA assumes homogeneity of variances, it is necessary to use
Welch's ANOVA to compares three means to see if they are equal when the data violates the
assumption of homogeneity of variances. In SPSS, the Welch’s output is:

Table 18
Welch ANOVA for Support Total: Budget Percent Difference by School Level
Welch Statistic
2.53

Df1
2

Df2
33.34

Sig.
0.10

The Welch output is not significant at the 0.05 level. Since p = 0.10, there are not
significant differences between the three school level groupings. Since the assumption of
homogeneity of variance was not met for this data, Welch’s adjusted F ratio (2.53) was used,
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which was not significant at the .05 alpha level (p shown as .10, that is p > .05), so it can be
concluded that the average percent change of support personnel spending does not differ
statically significantly levels by school level. Since there was no statistically significant
difference observed among the groups, no post hoc analysis was done.
Table 19
Non Personnel Total: Budget Percent Difference by School Level (n=94)
Groups
Elementary Schools
Middle Schools
High Schools
Total

N
58
19
17
94

Mean
21.67%
20.28%
17.79%
20.69%

SD
14.18%
11.57%
12.58%
13.36%

SE
1.86%
2.65%
3.05%
1.38%

Table 20
ANOVA - Non Personnel Total: Budget Percent Difference by School Level (n=94)
Source of Variation

SS

Df

MS

F

p

F crit

201.45

2

100.72

.56

.57

3.10

Within Groups

16408.46

91

180.31

Total

16609.91

93

Between Groups

p < 0.05

Non personnel spending reallocations are not statistically significant since the F(.56)
value is below the critical value. Levene’s test was not significant so the variances are assumed
to be equal. No post hoc analysis was completed because there was no statistically significant
difference observed. When given budget autonomy, principals, on average, do not choose to
make different investments in non personnel spending by grade level.
In each case except for teacher spending, the budget category percent change did change
but not at statistically significant levels. The final analysis to satisfy RQ1 is to test whether the
differences in spending are significant within each budget category. The paired sample t-test
identified whether the changes within the average school within budget categories were
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significant and unlikely due to chance. To ensure this data met the normalcy requirement for this
test, a Shapiro-Wilk test was run and the results are described in Appendix C and below. When
the Shapiro-Wilk test showed a distribution to be non-normal, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test
was also performed which agreed with the t-test findings. These Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test
findings are documented in Appendix D. The analysis that follows is the results of the paired ttest for each budget category by school level to compare the district allocation percentage and
the actually allocated percentage by the principal.
Total teacher spending.
Table 21
Teacher Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for Elementary School

Mean
Standard Deviation
Observations
Df
t Stat
P(T< = t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail
Alpha = 0.05

Earned Percent of School
Budget
69.18%
2.44%
58
57
(2.95)
0.00
2.00

Allocated Percent of
School Budget
69.53%
2.61%
58

There was a statistically significant difference in the mean of the earned budget for
teachers (M=69.18%, SD=2.44%) and the allocated budget for teachers (M=69.53%,
SD=2.61%). Mean difference in teacher spending did significantly change when elementary
principals were presented with budget autonomy. The number of schools that experienced a
change of more than one standard deviation is 12 from Appendix B so no single outlier appears
to have skewed the mean.
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Table 22
Teacher Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for Middle School
Earned Percent of
School Budget
74.94%

Allocated Percent of
School Budget
73.83%

1.89%

2.79%

Observations

19

19

Df

18

Mean
Standard Deviation

t Stat

2.52

P(T < = t) two-tail

0.02

t Critical two-tail

2.10

Alpha = 0.05

There was a statistically significant difference in the mean of the earned budget for
teachers (M=74.94%, SD=1.89%) and the allocated budget for teachers (M=73.83%,
SD=2.79%). Mean difference in teacher spending did significantly change when middle school
principals were presented with budget autonomy. The number of schools that experienced a
change of more than one standard deviation is 5 from Appendix B so no single outlier seems to
have skewed the mean.
Table 23
Teacher Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for High School
Earned Percent of
School Budget
64.13%

Allocated Percent of School
Budget
63.71%

5.48%

5.65%

Observations

17

17

Df

16

Mean
Standard Deviation

t Stat

0.87

P(T < = t) two-tail

0.40

t Critical two-tail

2.12

Alpha = 0.05

In high schools, there was not a statistically significant difference in the mean of the
earned budget for teachers (M=64.13%, SD=5.48%) and the allocated budget for teachers
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(M=63.71%, SD=5.65%). Mean difference in teacher spending did not significantly change
when high school principals were presented with budget autonomy. The number of schools that
experienced a change of more than one standard deviation is 2 from Appendix B so no single
outlier seems to have skewed the mean.
The change at the middle school level was the greatest. The average middle school
principal significantly decreased their spending on teachers by about 1.1%, which is
approximately 1.5 full-time teacher salaries.
Paraprofessional expenditure.

Table 24
Paraprofessional Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for Elementary School
Earned Percent of
School Budget
6.66%

Allocated Percent of
School Budget
6.91%

1.26%

1.33%

Observations

58

58

Df

57

Mean
Standard Deviation

t Stat

(4.46)

P(T<=t) two-tail

0.00

t Critical two-tail

2.00

Alpha = 0.05

For elementary school principals, there was a statistically significant difference in the
mean of the earned budget for paraprofessionals (M=6.66%, SD=1.26%) and the allocated
budget for paraprofessionals (M=6.91%, SD=1.33%). Mean difference in paraprofessional
spending did significantly change when elementary principals were presented with budget
autonomy. The number of schools that experienced a change of more than one standard
deviation is 11 from Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have skewed the mean.

65

Table 25
Paraprofessional Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for Middle School
Earned Percent of
School Budget
1.95%

Allocated Percent of
School Budget
2.12%

0.83%

0.84%

Observations

19

19

Df

18

Mean
Standard Deviation

t Stat

(2.13)

P(T< = t) two-tail

0.04

t Critical two-tail

2.10

Alpha = 0.05

For middle school principals, there was a statistically significant difference in the mean
of the earned budget for paraprofessionals (M=1.95%, SD=0.83%) and the allocated budget for
paraprofessionals (M=2.12%, SD=0.84%). Mean difference in paraprofessional spending did
significantly change when elementary principals were presented with budget autonomy. The
number of schools that experienced a change of more than one standard deviation is 2 from
Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have skewed the mean. For high school principals,
there was not a statistically significant difference in the mean of the earned budget for
paraprofessionals (M=2.71%, SD=1.59%) and the allocated budget for paraprofessionals
(M=2.66%, SD=1.56%). Mean difference in paraprofessional spending did not significantly
change when elementary principals were presented with budget autonomy.
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Table 26
Paraprofessional Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for High School

Mean

Earned Percent of
School Budget
2.71%

Allocated Percent of
School Budget
2.66%

1.59%

1.56%

17

17

Standard Deviation
Observations
Df

16

t Stat

0.55

P(T<=t) two-tail

0.59

t Critical two-tail

2.11

Alpha = 0.05

The number of schools that experienced a change of more than one standard deviation is
3 from Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have skewed the mean.
Mean spending levels for paraprofessionals did increase at the elementary and middle
school level. Paraprofessional mean spending for high schools did not change significantly. The
largest mean change was at the elementary level of 0.25 percent of the overall school budget.
Support personnel expenditure.
Table 27
Support Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for Elementary School
Earned Percent of
School Budget
17.87%

Allocated Percent of
School Budget
18.34%

2.18%

2.69%

Observations

58

58

Df

57

Mean
Standard Deviation

t Stat

(3.07)

P(T< = t) two-tail

0.00

t Critical two-tail

2.00

Alpha = 0.05
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For elementary school principals, there was a statistically significant difference in the
mean of the earned budget for support personnel (M=17.87%, SD=2.18%) and the allocated
budget for support personnel (M=18.34%, SD=2.69%). Mean difference in support personnel
spending did significantly change when elementary school principals were presented with budget
autonomy. The number of schools that experienced a change of more than one standard
deviation is 4 from Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have skewed the mean.
Table 28
Support Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for Middle School

Mean
Standard Deviation
Observations
Df
t Stat
P(T< = t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail
Alpha = 0.05

Earned Percent of
School Budget
17.48%
1.44%
19
18
(3.84)
0.00
2.10

Allocated Percent of
School Budget
18.83%
2.34%
19

For middle school principals, there was a statistically significant difference in the mean
of the earned budget for support personnel (M=17.48%, SD=1.44%) and the allocated budget for
support personnel (M=18.83%, SD=2.34%). Both data sets were normally distributed. Mean
difference in support personnel spending did significantly change when middle school principals
were presented with budget autonomy. The number of schools that experienced a change of
more than one standard deviation is 4 from Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have
skewed the mean. For high school principals, there was a statistically significant difference in the
mean of the earned budget for support personnel (M=24.24%, SD=4.90%) and the allocated
budget for support personnel (M=25.43%, SD=5.65%). Mean difference in support personnel

68

spending did significantly change when high school principals were presented with budget
autonomy.
Table 29
Support Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for High School
Earned Percent of School
Budget
24.24%

Allocated Percent of School
Budget
25.43%

4.90%

5.65%

Observations

17

17

Df

16

Mean
Standard Deviation

t Stat

(3.97)

P(T<=t) two-tail

0.00

t Critical two-tail

2.12

Alpha = 0.05

The number of schools that experienced a change of more than one standard deviation is
4 from Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have skewed the mean.
At each grade level, mean spending on support personnel increased. This mean increase
was especially pronounced at the secondary level where both middle and high school principals
increased mean spending on support by more than 1 percent.
Non personnel expenditure.
For elementary school principals, there was a statistically significant difference in the
mean of the earned budget for support personnel (M=6.28%, SD=0.79%) and the allocated
budget for support personnel (M=5.22%, SD=1.24%). Mean difference in non personnel
spending did significantly change when elementary school principals were presented with budget
autonomy. The number of schools that experienced a change of more than one standard
deviation is 9 from Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have skewed the mean.
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Table 30
Non Personnel Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for Elementary School
Earned Percent of
School Budget
6.28%

Allocated Percent of
School Budget
5.22%

0.79%

1.24%

Observations

58

58

Df

57

Mean
Standard Deviation

t Stat

6.49

P(T< = t) two-tail

0.00

t Critical two-tail

2.00

Alpha = 0.05

Table 31
Non Personnel Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for Middle School
Earned Percent of
School Budget
5.63%

Allocated Percent of
School Budget
5.22%

0.44%

1.30%

Observations

19

19

Df

18

Mean
Standard Deviation

t Stat

1.35

P(T< = t) two-tail

0.66

t Critical two-tail

2.10

Alpha = 0.05

For middle school principals, there was not a statistically significant difference in the
mean of the earned budget for support personnel (M=5.63%, SD=0.44%) and the allocated
budget for support personnel (M=5.22%, SD=1.30%). Mean difference in non personnel
spending did not significantly change when middle school principals were presented with budget
autonomy. The number of schools that experienced a change of more than one standard
deviation is 4 from Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have skewed the mean.
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Table 32
Non Personnel Total: t-Test, Paired Two Sample for Means for High School
Earned Percent of
School Budget
8.93%

Allocated Percent of School
Budget
8.19%

2.05%

1.50%

Observations

17

17

Df

16

Mean
Standard Deviation

t Stat

1.50

P(T< = t) two-tail

0.11

t Critical two-tail

2.12

Alpha = 0.05

For high school principals, there was not a statistically significant difference in the mean
of the earned budget for support personnel (M=8.93%, SD=2.05%) and the allocated budget for
support personnel (M=8.19%, SD=1.50%). Mean difference in non personnel spending did not
significantly change when high school principals were presented with budget autonomy. The
number of schools that experienced a change of more than one standard deviation is 3 from
Appendix B so no single outlier seems to have skewed the mean.
Table 33
Summary Table of Budget Reallocation t-Tests
Budget Categories

Elementary Schools

Middle Schools

High Schools

Teachers Total

Increase (Sig)

Decrease (Sig)

Not Significant

Paraprofessionals

Increase (Sig)

Increase (Sig)

Not Significant

Support

Increase (Sig)

Increase (Sig)

Increase (Sig)

Non Personnel

Decrease (Sig)

Not Significant

Not Significant

Across SVCS, mean spending on support personnel increased at each grade level school.
This spending reallocation was statistically significant at each grade level. Elementary schools,
on average, increased their average spending levels on teachers and paraprofessionals while
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middle and high schools decreased their average spending levels on teachers. At all levels, on
average, principals reallocated average spending from non personnel toward other categories, but
this was only statistically significant at the elementary level. The findings from RQ1
demonstrate that there are statistically significant areas where principals, on average exercise
budget flexibility by adjusting the budgets provided to them via central office allocations.
Additionally, as Appendix B shows, in all cases there were multiple schools that were more than
a standard deviation away from the mean that impact the analysis of these findings. The
implications of these findings will be considered further in the discussion session.
Research question two.
RQ2 seeks to understand if the exercise of budget autonomy, in a distributed leadership
environment, varies by school performance. This analysis builds on the findings from RQ1
which indicate that budget flexibility is exercised by the average principal to varying degrees
based on grade level and budget category. The purpose of this analysis is to compare the exercise
of budget autonomy between high-performing and low-performing schools at SVCS. The
hypothesis is that the two means are the same, which would indicate that spending allocations,
on average, do not deviate from distract allocations for each budget category.
As mentioned earlier, SVCS schools were divided into high and low performance bands
by comparing the CCRPI single score for 2016-17. To create a categorical variable and maintain
sample size, schools that scored below the district median were categorized as low-performing
and schools that scored above the median were categorized as high-performing. Since the State
accountability calculations are different for each grade level of school, schools were sorted by
the median score for the school level. Below is a summary table of schools included in each
category. Since there is an odd number of schools at both middle and high school level, the
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median school in both categories was excluded from the calculation as neither high nor low
performing.
Table 34
School Performance by Grade Level in 2016-17
School Level

Median CCRPI for
SVCS
78.15
71.10
80.50

Elementary
Middle
High

Number of Low
Performing Schools
29
9
8

Number of High
Performing Schools
29
9
8

To assess whether budget flexibility is observed, each of the four budget
categories was first separated into two groups by median performance levels. From this table, it
becomes clearer that it is necessary to sort out performance by grade level since the medians vary
so substantially. To ensure an appropriate cross-section of district behavior, it is important to
represent all grade levels. Since the middle school median is almost ten points below the high
school mean, middle schools would be dramatically underrepresented in the analysis if the
performance by grade level was not established. The weighted average is based on the actual
school level allocations described in Table 4.
Table 35
Average of Percent Absolute Value of Change in Budget by School Performance
Budget Categories

High Performing
Schools

Low Performing
Schools

All School
Average

Teachers

1.08%

1.81%

1.45%

Support Personnel

5.38%

7.46%

6.44%

Paraprofessionals

5.01%

7.30%

6.18%

Non Personnel

16.40%

24.79%

20.69%

Weighted Average

3.01%

4.53%

3.79%
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Each budget category was then analyzed to identify if there is a significant change in
spending patterns from the district allocation by performance level. The paired samples t-test
was used to see if the change in the means of the two groups were statistically significant. The
independent samples t-test compares the means of two independent groups in order to determine
whether there is statistical evidence that the means of the data sets are statistically significantly
different (Bowen, 2016). Since each data point is unrelated to a data point in the other data set,
an independent approach is appropriate. To ensure the assumption of normality was met, the
Shapiro-Wilk test was run and the results are described in Appendix C. In cases where the data
was non-normal, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was also performed which agreed with the
findings of t-test in each case as described in Appendix D. Each analysis is provided below.
Table 36
Teacher Total, Percent Change in Budget Group
Groups
High Performance
Low Performance

N
46
46

Mean
1.08%
1.77%

SD
1.35%
1.78%

Std Error Mean
0.20%
0.26%

Table 37
Teacher Total, Percent Change in Budget: Independent t-Test Single

On average, schools in low performing schools exercise more budget autonomy in
teacher spending (M = 1.77, SE = 0.26), than high performing schools (M = 1.08, SE = 0.20).
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The difference of 0.69 was statistically significant t (90) = -2.11, p = 0.04. The Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank test was also performed which agreed with the findings of t-test.

Table 38
Paraprofessional, Percent Change in Budget Group
Groups
High Performance
Low Performance

N
46
46

Mean
5.01%
7.62%

SD
8.56%
16.84%

Std Error Mean
1.26%
2.48%

Table 39
Paraprofessional, Percent Change in Budget: Independent t-Test

On average, schools in low performing schools exercise more budget autonomy in
paraprofessional spending (M = 7.62, SE = 2.48), than high performing schools (M = 5.01, SE =
1.26). The difference of 2.61 was not significant t(90) = -0.94, p = 0.35. The Wilcoxon SignedRank test was also performed which agreed with the findings of the t-test.
Table 40
Support Personnel, Percent Change in Budget Group
Groups
High Performance
Low Performance

N
46
46

Mean
5.38%
7.41%

SD
4.74%
4.31%

Std Error Mean
0.70%
0.64%
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Table 41
Support Personnel, Percent Change in Budget: Independent t-Test

On average, schools in low performing schools exercise more budget autonomy in
support personnel spending (M = 7.41, SE = 0.64), than high performing schools (M = 5.38, SE
= 0.70). The difference of 2.03 was statistically significant t(90) = -2.15, p = 0.04. The
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test was also performed which agreed with the findings of the t-test.
Table 42
Non Personnel, Percent Change in Budget Group
Groups

N

Mean

High Performance
Low Performance

46
46

16.40%
24.89%

Std
Deviation
12.33%
13.16%

Std Error Mean
1.82%
1.94%

Table 43
Non Personnel, Percent Change in Budget: Independent t-test

On average, schools in low performing schools exercise more budget autonomy in non
personnel spending (M = 24.89, SE = 1.94), than high performing schools (M = 16.40, SE =
1.82). The difference of 8.49 was significant t(90) = -3.12, p = 0.002. The Wilcoxon SignedRank test was also performed which agreed with the findings of t-test. The average of low-
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performing schools represented more than a 1.5% increase in budget changes from the district
provided allocation compared to high-performing schools in SVCS (Table 30). Specifically, in
all four budget categories, the average low-performing schools generated budgets that reflected
more change than the higher performing schools. This change was statistically significant in
three of the four categories. Although low-performing schools did show an increase in spending
on paraprofessionals, it was not statistically significant. The paraprofessionals budget category
has the most limited budget impact of the four categories, representing about 4% of the overall
SVCS school budget spend.
Research question three.
The third research question investigates whether the exercise of budget flexibility
increases when schools have multiple years of experience building budgets in a distributed
leadership environment. Much of the research indicates that unfamiliarity and inexperience with
decentralization constrains adoption (Honig, 2012). By comparing schools that have had a longer
period of time to operate with budget autonomy with those that have just been granted this
autonomy, it will be possible to gain more insight into whether the exercise of autonomy
increases over time in SVCS.
SVCS has provided a unique opportunity to study the impact of time on the exercise of
budget autonomy in the implementation structure that it negotiated with the state department of
education. The district adopted a three-year phased-in approach in three cohorts, so 2016 was the
first year of complete data. Schools were assigned to cohorts in a fashion that was to be
representative of the district demographics and geography. The breakout of cohort phases is
identified below.
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Table 44
Number of Schools Assigned to Cohort by Year in SVCS
Cohort

Number of Schools

Planning Year

Implementation Year

1

20

2013-14

2014-15

2

37

2014-15

2015-16

3

37

2015-16

2016-17

The first analysis of school by cohort was descriptive to determine the average amount of
budget change by cohort.
Table 45
Percentage Change in Average Budget Allocation by Autonomy Implementation Cohort
Budget Categories

Cohort 1

Cohort 2

Cohort 3

Grand Total

Teachers Total

2.11%

1.29%

1.26%

1.45%

Support

6.96%

5.97%

6.64%

6.44%

Paraprofessionals

9.83%

4.36%

6.03%

6.18%

Non Personnel

21.56%

21.28%

19.62%

20.69%

Weighted Average Change

4.59%

3.52%

3.63%

3.79%

As the table above shows, when comparing the total average change across cohorts,
Cohort 1 changed its budget allocation by about one percent compared to Cohorts 2 and 3. This
weighted average is based on the actual school level allocations described in Table 4.
To calculate whether the total budget change was statistically significant, each budget
category was analyzed using ANOVA since there are three cohorts of data. Each of those
ANOVA results is listed below by budget category.
Since the sample size is unequal when comparing schools by implementation cohort, it
was necessary to ensure that there is homogeneity of variance to be able to apply ANOVA
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(Bowen, 2016). Since the p-value was greater than 0.05 in each budget category ANOVA, equal
variances are assumed and the homogeneity of variances assumption is satisfied (Bowen, 2016).
Table 46
Teacher Percent Change in Budget: Single Factor by Implementation Cohort (Summary)
Groups
Cohort 1
Cohort 2
Cohort 3
Total

N
20
37
37
94

Mean
2.11%
1.29%
1.26%
1.45%

SD
1.74%
1.44%
1.66%
1.61%

SE
0.39%
0.24%
0.27%
0.17%

Table 47
Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variances for Teacher Total
Levene’s Statistic
0.10

Df1
2

Df2
91

Sig.
0.90

Since p > .05 we can assume the assumption of the homogeneity of variances has not
been violated.
Table 48
Teacher, Percent Change in Budget: Single Factor by Implementation Cohort (ANOVA)
Source of Variation

SS

df

MS

F

P-value

F crit

Between Groups

10.86

2

5.43

2.14

0.12

3.10

Within Groups

231.12

91

2.54

Total

241.99

93

Alpha = 0.05

Average teacher spending reallocations are not statistically significant by cohort since the
F(2.14) value is below the critical value and p > .05. Since the Shapiro-Wilk test in Appendix C
showed this distribution to be non-normal, the Kruskal-Wallis test was also performed which
agreed with the findings of ANOVA. These Kruskal-Wallis test findings are documented in
Appendix D. No post hoc analysis was completed because there was no statistically significant
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difference observed. When given budget autonomy, the cohort analysis did not reveal
statistically significant differences between cohorts on the teacher spending category.
Table 49
Paraprofessional, Percent Change in Budget: Single Factor by Implementation Cohort
(Summary)
Groups
Cohort 1
Cohort 2
Cohort 3
Total

N
20
37
37
94

Mean
9.83%
4.36%
6.03%
6.18%

Standard Deviation
24.03%
5.75%
10.20%
13.24%

Standard Error
5.37%
0.95%
1.68%
1.37%

Table 50
Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variances for Paraprofessional Total
Levene’s Statistic
7.15

Df1
2

Df2
91

Sig.
0.01

The p-value of the Levene’s test is less than 0.05 so it is assumed the variances are
unequal. Since one-way ANOVA assumes homogeneity of variances, it is necessary to use
Welch's ANOVA to compares three means to see if they are equal when the data violates the
assumption of homogeneity of variances. In SPSS, the Welch’s output is:
Table 51
Welch ANOVA for Paraprofessional: Budget Percent Difference by School Level
Welch Statistic
0.80

Df1
2

Df2
39.03

Sig.
.46

The Welch output is not significant at the 0.05 level since p = 0.46, so there are not
significant differences between the three school level groupings. Since the assumption of
homogeneity of variance was not met for this data, Welch’s adjusted F ratio (0.80) was used,
which was not significant at the .05 alpha level (p =0.46), so it can be concluded that average
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percent change of paraprofessional spending does not differ significantly by cohort. Since the
Shapiro-Wilk test in Appendix C showed this distribution to be non-normal, the Kruskal-Wallis
test was also performed which agreed with the findings of ANOVA. These Kruskal-Wallis test
findings are documented in Appendix D. Since there was no statistically significant difference
observed, no post hoc analysis was done.
Table 52
Support Personnel Percent Change in Budget: Single Factor by Implementation Cohort
(Summary)
Groups
Cohort 1
Cohort 2
Cohort 3
Total

N
20
37
37
94

Mean
6.96%
5.97%
6.64%
6.44%

Standard Deviation
4.94%
4.69%
4.38%
4.59%

Standard Error
1.11%
0.77%
0.72%
0.47%

Table 53
Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variances for Support Personnel
Levene’s Statistic
0.60

Df1
2

Df2
91

Sig.
0.555

Since p-value from Levene’s test is greater than .05, the assumption of the homogeneity
of variances has not been violated. Therefore, it is appropriate to use ANOVA to compare the
means for change in spending for support personnel.
Table 54
Support Personnel Percent Change in Budget: Single Factor by Implementation Cohort
(ANOVA)
Source of Variation

SS

df

MS

F

P-value

F crit

14.99

2

7.50

0.35

0.71

3.10

Within Groups

1944.70

91

21.37

Total

1959.70

93

Between Groups

Alpha = 0.05
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Average support personnel spending reallocations are not statistically significant by
cohort since the F(0.35) value is below the critical value and the p > .05. No post hoc analysis
was completed because there was no statistically significant difference observed. When given
budget autonomy, the cohort analysis did not reveal statistically significant differences between
cohorts on the support personnel spending category.
The difference between the average means for support spending were all within one
percent and was not statistically significant per the results of the ANOVA test. Therefore, there
is no evidence to suggest that the number of years of experience with decentralization
significantly changed the investment in support personnel.
Table 55
Non Personnel, Percent Change in Budget: Single Factor by Implementation Cohort
(Summary)
Groups
Cohort 1
Cohort 2
Cohort 3
Total

N
20
37
37
94

Mean
21.56%
21.28%
19.62%
20.69%

Standard Deviation
14.50%
13.35%
13.05%
13.36%

Standard Error
3.24%
2.19%
2.15%
1.38%

Table 56
Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variances for Non Personnel Total
Levene’s Statistic
0.14

Df1
2

Df2
91

Sig.
0.866

Since p-value from Levene’s test is greater than .05, the assumption of the homogeneity
of variances has not been violated. Therefore, it is appropriate to use ANOVA to compare the
means for change in spending for non personnel.
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Table 57
Non Personnel Percent Change in Budget: Single Factor by Implementation Cohort
(ANOVA)
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

SS
70.37
16548.54
16609.91

Df
2
91
93

MS
35.19
181.75

F
0.19

P-value
0.82

F crit
3.10

Average non personnel spending reallocations are not statistically significant by cohort
since the F(0.19) value is below the critical value and the p > .05. No post hoc analysis was
completed because there was no statistically significant difference observed. When given budget
autonomy, the cohort analysis did not reveal statistically significant differences between cohorts
on the non personnel spending category.
The greatest amount of average budget percentage change occurred in non personnel
spending for each cohort. While the mean changes were very close to each other, as in the
previous cases, Cohort 1 still demonstrated the highest levels of budget changes from the district
allocation. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the amount of years of experience with
decentralization significantly changes the investment in non personnel.
In general, Cohort 1 reallocated more dollars than any other cohort for each budget
category. However, for each budget category, these spending changes were not statistically
different, so the null hypothesis that the means are the same cannot be rejected by this evidence.
Hence, although Cohort 1 consistently reallocated more funds, it is not at statistically significant
levels so it cannot be concluded that the amount of time operating in a decentralized budget
environment leads to the greater exercise of budget autonomy.
Summary of results.
All three research questions analyzed school spending from the 2016-17 school year to
understand if principals, on average, spent their funds differently than the standard district
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allocation. RQ1 identified, on average, schools changed more than 8.0% of their school budget in
this decentralization initiative. The majority of budget changes were statistically significant;
three specific findings were also practically significant. First, middle school principals were
allocated 74.94% of their budget for teachers but shifted more than 1.1% of those funds toward
other spending categories. More than 20 percent of elementary schools made a change greater
than one standard deviation from the mean. Second, elementary school principals reduced their
non personnel spending from 6.28% to 5.22% and shifted those funds to support other teaching
and non-teaching adults in their building. Third, at all levels, principals invested more resources,
on average, in support personnel.
RQ2 sought to quantify the differing behavior between high and low performing schools.
The evidence from SVCS is that low-performing schools exercise this autonomy at greater rates
than their peers in high performing schools. High-performing schools reallocated an average of
approximately 16% of their resources while low-performing schools changed 25% of their
spending allocation. The percentage change in budget allocation was statistically significant for
each budget category except for paraprofessionals, which represents a relatively small
component of the overall allocation.
In the analysis of RQ3, the data shows that Cohort 1 consistently reallocated more funds
than Cohorts 2 and 3. Cohort 1 adjusted 10.11% of their budget while Cohort 2 changed 8.22%
and Cohort 3 altered 8.39%. However, it is not statistically significant so it cannot be concluded
that the amount of time operating in a decentralized budget environment leads to the greater
exercise of budget autonomy.

84

Discussion.
The goal of the study was to provide insight into the exercise of budget autonomy. This
study was motivated by the desire to better understand the impact of the trend toward more
decentralization, especially around school budgets. While decentralization efforts are on the rise,
case after case demonstrates that local decision-making has not been affected (Goertz & Stiefel,
1998; Honig & Rainey, 2012). Specifically, principals stayed with long-standing budget practice
and have not selected to exercise budget autonomy (Bjork & Blase, 2009; Honig & Rainey,
2012). The ultimate purpose of this study was to gather a sense of whether this strategy was
having an impact on principal budgeting decisions by reviewing one specific district’s
experience.
The study was intentionally designed to identify the activity of school leaders instead of
stated preference. The positivist quantitative approach was required to get past intention and
determine the actual actions taken. The study was constructed to measure average behavior
across schools as evidenced by the actual principal allocation. Given the robust budget data set
provided and their high degree of transparency and commitment to distributed leadership, the
SVCS budget decentralization initiative offered a unique opportunity to observe whether
principals exercise autonomy. As the data reveals, the picture is complex. The analysis of
spending averages demonstrates that some principals are seizing budget autonomy while other
groups continue to implement status quo allocations. This study has been careful to avoid
assigning value to the exercise of budget flexibility since that is outside the scope of this
analysis. While the efficacy of budget autonomy is undefined, there is statistically significant
evidence that some groups embrace the budgetary aspect of decentralization reforms while others
maintain their status quo approach.
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Summary of implications.
Five key implications emerged which are relevant for SVCS and districts considering
budget decentralization.
First, while many allocations remained the same, there is evidence that principals did
significantly alter their budget from the district guidelines in some cases. When averaged by
budget category, the size of these budget changes by category ranged between 1.5% and 20.7%.
The average change across the four budget categories was 8.69%. Specifically, spending changes
were most consistent on non personnel budget items. Teacher spending decreased, on average, at
the middle and high school level. While this study did not explore the potential motivations,
principals may have valued additional spending on non-teaching adults in the building instead of
perhaps lowering class size by expanding teacher staffing levels.
On its face, this behavior meets the stated decentralization goal of principals customizing
their allocations to meet the needs of their communities. Without assessing the efficacy of these
changes, it is impossible to declare the initiative a success. However, there is evidence that this
reform had the intended behavioral outcome, specifically around elementary school principals
which demonstrated statistically significant reallocations from non personnel spending.
Second, the grade level of the school seems to matter. There were statistically different
changes by grade level with middle school changes the most pronounced. The t-tests confirmed,
in middle schools specifically, that the majority of spending categories experienced budget
changes when principals were given the option to make changes. This finding might suggest that
middle schools could be a useful starting point for districts to deepen their understanding of
principal motivations. Further investigation would be required to understand why middle schools
opt for a customized budget rather than the working with the district allocation.
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Third, there was a consistent reallocation from non personnel spending toward other
budget categories. This finding suggests that this one district is likely overweighting its
allocation in the original formulation to schools. Hence, district financial staff might consider
reducing the original funding level for non personnel spending since the current level seems to
be consistently too high and requires local adjustment.
Fourth, since low-performing SVCS schools showed significantly greater exercise of
budget autonomy, a strategy of budget autonomy holds promise to change low-performing
school’s budget allocation behavior. SVCS’s goal of this initiative was to enable each principal
to deploy their school resources according to their school’s unique needs (FCS Guide, 2017).
While this exercise of flexibility may not be effective, it does suggest that in this case, the reform
created the intended type of action. Surely if the converse were true, policymakers would have to
reassess their implementation of a strategy designed to change behavior if the impact is a
perpetuation of status quo decision-making. This insight is essential as districts continue to focus
limited resources and energy on a reform strategy that may ultimately have a negligible impact
on behavior. Reform strategies that do not have an impact may create noise and further
distraction from the difficult work of improving teaching and learning (Honig, 2012).
Fifth, the average school that operated in this budget decentralization for three years
reallocated more of their budget than schools in their first two years. On average, schools in the
first cohort of this reform reallocation about 10% of their budget while subsequent groups
reallocated about 8% of their budget. Though it is not statistically significant, the increase in
reallocation by Cohort 1 schools is consistent with the distributed literature research that shows
that knowledge of the reform is an essential criterion for success. Principals in Cohort 1, by
virtue of their 2012 start date, participated in more annual training cycles and have experienced
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budget autonomy for multiple years. The distributed literature suggests that leaders are more
likely to embrace autonomy when they have the knowledge and support to take on this additional
body of work (McKenzie & Locke, 2014). Another explanation is that principals that are
innately motivated to utilize this authority will immediately make changes when presented with
the opportunity. Since this finding was not statistically significant, further research is required to
draw any actionable conclusion around implementation growth over time.
Limitations of the study.
This study utilized a non-probability sample which targets a “particular group, in the full
knowledge that it does not represent the wider population; it simply represents itself” (Cohen et
al., 2013, p. 113). The most direct challenge of a non-probability sample is that it is difficult to
generalize the findings beyond the specific population examined in the study (Cohen et al.,
2013). SVCS, though relatively large, does not represent the larger population of school districts
in the United States because it has access to the Charter System Act. A structured commitment to
decentralization like the Charter System Act in Georgia is not found in other states, so the
findings will not be able to be easily transferred (Badertscher, 2013).
Additionally, SVCS has a size and scope that limits comparisons across districts. As a
large district in Georgia, SVCS has aspects of the other 179 districts in the state including
schools in urban and suburban settings but does not contain schools that are rural in nature.
SVCS’s large resource base helps it serve its uniquely substantial geographical footprint.
Furthermore, only one year of data was addressed because of the shift in priority from the district
leadership. Time series data might shed additional light on the exercise of autonomy, but it was
not available at this point.
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The replicability of these findings may also be constrained by the unique charter system
designation available in Georgia. SVCS had made local school autonomy the centerpiece of its
reform strategy. A critical element of the systematic decentralization in SVCS is the result of its
designation under the Georgia Charter System Act of 2007 (Georgia Department of Education,
2017). Without the legal structure of a decentralization contract with the state, other systems
might not be able to compare their principal’s exercise of budget autonomy. In order to improve
the power of these tests, all 94 schools of SVCS were included in this analysis. Power refers to
the likelihood that this test will find a statistically significant difference when such a difference
actually exists (Bowen, 2016). For RQ2, as a result of the reduced sample size of schools that are
either high or low performing, power for this test was less than RQ1 which limits the strength of
these findings.
The ceiling effect could also be a limitation that constrains principal actions by limiting
the amount of actual available flexibility. The ceiling effect is a measurement limitation that
occurs when the highest possible total or close to the highest total on a measurement instrument
is reached, thereby decreasing the likelihood that the testing instrument has accurately measured
the intended domain (Stam, 2010). In this case, the measurement instrument is the principal’s
budget allocation. In building a budget, principals do not have unbounded budget flexibility in
staffing allocations. For example, every student requires to be assessed by a teacher of record,
some custodial staff is necessary to manage the facility, special needs students have legally
mandated teacher-student staffing ratios, and a bookkeeper is required to manage compliance
requirements. Hence, the amount of budget flexibility is constrained because of the ceiling
effect, so the budget allocation measurement may not capture all of the possible flexibility a
principal may desire to exercise.
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This study chose to focus on four high-level budget domains, which created a trade-off
between the level of detail of the data and the ability to make meaningful comparisons across
categories. Within each of the four domains (teacher, paraprofessional, support, and nonpersonnel), SVCS has dozens of additional budget lines that identify specific positions and nonpersonnel expenses. However, including this level of detail would complicate comparisons
because of the breadth of options and limited number of data points. For example, there are
more than 40 different teaching positions available to SVCS principals and 60 different support
positions. If a position-level analysis was used, the amount of staffing variation among schools
would greatly reduce the ability to draw conclusions from school-level comparisons. By
reducing the domains to four, comparisons across domains are more meaningful, though some
specific position level insight is not available.
Another limitation of this sample is that it only investigated general fund dollars from
state and property taxes. This study did not analyze categorical or special revenue sources like
Title funds from the Federal government which have their own reporting requirements and are
not subject to district flexibility. These represent a minority of funds in this district and are
highly prescriptive so their allocation was not analyzed, though it likely impacts schools
spending priorities in some cases.
Recommendations for further research.
Based on these limitations outlined above, future research into the exercise of budget
autonomy may wish to adopt a case study approach of a limited number of decentralization
initiatives to perform a qualitative investigation. Such research should draw on participants’
lived experiences to gain an understanding of the motivations that drive principal behavior.
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Although this study did compare schools who have differing years of experience in building
autonomous budget, to gain a deeper understanding of the impact of time, it would be useful to
follow the same schools for multiple years. This approach poses a variety of challenges because
of the regular changes in district allocations year to year, but a more narrowly focused study
could accomplish this aim and may uncover a relationship where this study did not.
Another key area that was outside the scope of this study was the efficacy of budget
autonomy. This study endeavored only to find its existence, not to assess its value. Given that
there was a significant increase in the exercise of budget autonomy at low-performing schools at
SVCS, future research could seek to identify if there are aspects of autonomy decisions that can
be linked to gains in student achievement. Now that autonomy has been identified is select
circumstances at SVCS, an important next step is to seek a connection with student achievement.
Conclusion.
Decentralization has grown in popularity as district leaders are investigating strategies to
help low-performing schools better to meet their students’ needs (Fermanich, Odden, &
Archibald, 2000). This research study began with the assumption that, per the literature, the
budget autonomy component of decentralization reforms remains unimplemented at the school
level. If decentralization does not impact budget decisions at schools that are in the midst of
reform and restructuring, then there is an opportunity to create more coherence by shifting
attention away from budget autonomy.
What emerged from this study of one district operating under a distributed leadership
model is far more nuanced. Principals at different grade levels exercised different levels of
budget autonomy. When principals are provided flexibility, in many cases, they reallocate dollars
from the non personnel allocation. The destination of this reallocation of dollars, however, is not
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consistent across schools. Perhaps that is the point. Advocates of decentralization would likely
take encouragement from this limited evidence that the availability of budget autonomy is
impacting behavior, even though the larger impact of those changes require further investigation.
Skeptics may note that at the secondary level, these reallocations generally moved away from
investing in teacher staffing and more into support personnel who are not in the classroom.
It is the hope of this researcher that as districts pursue decentralization, they note the
distributed leadership literature regarding the organizational requirements for change. Distributed
leadership argues school leaders are more likely to embrace autonomy when two major attributes
are in place: an explicit policy that defines the role of district leadership and appropriate training
for school-based personnel now assuming new decision-making authority (Harris, 2013; Honig
& Rainey, 2012).
While the replicability of the findings of this study has its natural limits, there is evidence
that principals are making different decisions that are enabled by budget autonomy at SVCS.
This insight into the degree to which schools exercise permitted autonomy can inform the
decentralization implementation efforts that are currently underway in district offices across the
country.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
N

MEAN

STD. DEV

MIN

MAX

TT_EARNED % OF SCHOOL BUDGET

94

69.4323%

4.56887%

50.46% 77.51%

TT_USED % OF SCHOOL BUDGET

94

69.3498%

4.59090%

48.91% 77.43%

PP_EARNED % OF SCHOOL BUDGET

94

4.9950%

2.47891%

0.86%

11.19%

PP_USED % OF SCHOOL BUDGET

94

5.1707%

2.56405%

0.86%

11.19%

SUPPORT_EARNED % OF SCHOOL BUDGT 94

18.9458%

3.70386%

13.75% 39.46%

SUPPORT_USED % OF SCHOOL BUDGET

94

19.7192%

4.27758%

13.17% 41.65%

NP_EARNED % OF SCHOOL BUDGET

94

6.6270%

1.54523%

4.92%

13.25%

NP_USED % OF SCHOOL BUDGET

94

5.7603%

1.723898%

2.72%

10.90%

TT_BUDGETCHANGE%_C1 (ABS)

20

2.1052%

1.73963%

0.00%

5.57%

TT_BUDGETCHANGE%_C3 (ABS)

37

1.2613%

1.66190%

0.00%

5.79%

TT_BUDGETCHANGE%_C2 (ABS)

37

1.2890%

1.43561%

0.00%

4.94%

PP_BUDGETCHANGE%_C1 (ABS)

20

9.8296%

24.02905%

0.00%

100.00%

PP_BUDGETCHANGE%_C2 (ABS)

37

4.3577%

5.75467%

0.00%

20.00%

PP_BUDGETCHANGE%_C3 (ABS)

37

6.0261%

10.20357%

0.00%

40.00%

SUPPORT_BUDGETCHANGE%_C1 (ABS)

20

6.9572%

4.94235%

0.07%

17.27%

SUPPORT_BUDGETCHANGE%_C2 (ABS)

37

5.9703%

4.68503%

0.07%

20.18%

SUPPORT_BUDGETCHANGE%_C3 (ABS)

37

6.6401%

4.37929%

0.00%

23.06%

NP_BUDGETCHANGE%_C1 (ABS)

20

21.5597%

14.50185%

0.36%

48.31%

NP_BUDGETCHANGE%_C2 (ABS)

37

21.2792%

13.34707%

0.29%

54.66%

NP_BUDGETCHANGE%_C3 (ABS)

37

19.6195%

13.04967%

0.00%

56.88%

TT_BUDGETCHANGE%_HP (ABS)

46

1.0758%

1.35230%

0.00%

4.15%

TT_BUDGETCHANGE%_LP (ABS)

46

1.7745%

1.79711%

0.00%

5.79%

PP_BUDGETCHANGE%_HP (ABS)

46

5.0068%

8.56033%

0.00%

38.46%

PP_BUDGETCHANGE%_LP (ABS)

46

7.6191%

16.84462%

0.00%

100.00%

SUPPORT_BUDGETCHANGE%_HP (ABS)

46

5.3785%

4.74399%

0.00%

23.06%

SUPPORT_BUDGETCHANGE%_LP (ABS)

46

7.4075%

4.31282%

0.29%

20.18%

NP_BUDGETCHANGE%_HP (ABS)

46

16.4039%

12.32776%

0.00%

48.31%

96
NP_BUDGETCHANGE%_LP (ABS)

46

24.8947%

13.15965%

0.02%

56.88%

VARIABLE DEFINITION
TT

TEACHER TOTAL BUDGET

PP

PARAPROFESSIONAL BUDGET

SUPPORT

SUPPORT PERSONNEL BUDGET

NP

NON PERSONNEL BUDGET

C1

COHORT 1

C2

COHORT 2

C3

COHORT 3

HP

HIGH PERFORMING SCHOOLS

LP

LOW PERFORMING SCHOOLS

ABS

ABSOLUTE VALUE

NOTE: THE PARAPROFESSIONAL CATEGORY MAY HAVE A MINIMUM OF 0% AND A MAXIMUM OF 100%
BECAUSE NO CEILING EFFECT APPLIES TO PARAPROFESSIONALS. SCHOOLS DO NOT HAVE A REQUIREMENT
TO KEEP A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF PARAPROFESSIONALS IN THEIR SCHOOL SO ALL OF THESE POSITONS CAN
BE REALLOCATED TO OTHER BUDGET LINES.
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APPENDIX B
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR BUDGET CHANGE PERCENTAGE BY DOMAIN
Level
Summary

Mean

N

Std.
Deviation

Min

Max

N > Mean + SD

Teachers

ES

0.81%

58

1.15%

0.00%

4.15%

12

Teachers

MS

2.28%

19

1.89%

0.00%

5.57%

5

Teachers

HS

2.70%

17

1.55%

0.10%

5.79%

2

Paraprofessionals

ES

4.13%

58

6.05%

0.00%

24.19%

11

Paraprofessionals

MS

11.58%

19

24.66%

0.00%

100.00%

2

Paraprofessionals

HS

7.13%

17

12.41%

0.00%

38.46%

3

Support Personnel

ES

5.68%

58

3.95%

0.00%

15.05%

4

Support Personnel

MS

9.21%

19

6.40%

0.29%

23.06%

4

Support Personnel

HS

5.96%

17

3.04%

1.99%

11.25%

4

Non Personnel

ES

21.67%

58

14.18%

0.00%

56.88%

9

Non Personnel

MS

20.28%

19

11.57%

0.02%

42.38%

4

Non Personnel

HS

17.79%

17

12.59%

0.36%

45.10%

3

Budget Category
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APPENDIX C:
TESTS OF NORMALITY
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Level
TT_BudgetChange%

Statistic

Shapiro-Wilk

Df

Sig.

Statistic

df

Sig.

ES

.305

58

.000

.828

58

.000

HS

.129

17

.200*

.955

17

.534

MS

.150

19

.200*

.958

19

.530

ES

.357

58

.000

.777

58

.000

HS

.376

17

.000

.766

17

.001

MS

.365

19

.000

.551

19

.000

ES

.084

58

.200*

.979

58

.429

HS

.172

17

.196

.928

17

.203

MS

.156

19

.200*

.943

19

.294

Support_BudgetChange% ES

.110

58

.078

.958

58

.043

HS

.126

17

.200*

.935

17

.265

MS

.117

19

.200*

.963

19

.628

PP_BudgetChange%

NP_BudgetChange%

*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Level
TT_Earned % of School Budget

Statistic

df

Sig.

Statistic

df

Sig.

ES

.090

58

.200*

.971

58

.188

HS

.228

17

.019

.795

17

.002

19

.200*

.950

19

.400

.971

58

.181

MS
TT_Used % of School Budget

PP_Earned % of School Budget

PP_Used % of School Budget

Support_Earned % of School Budget

Support_Used % of School Budget

NP_Earned % of School Budget

NP_Used % of School Budget

.092

ES

.091

58

.200*

HS

.326

17

.000

.662

17

.000

MS

.179

19

.110

.922

19

.126

.959

58

.046

ES

.063

58

.200*

HS

.234

17

.014

.788

17

.001

MS

.187

19

.080

.884

19

.026

ES

.093

58

.200*

.951

58

.020

HS

.219

17

.029

.743

17

.000

.916

19

.094

MS

.150

19

.200*

ES

.139

58

.007

.897

58

.000

HS

.364

17

.000

.607

17

.000

.942

19

.284

MS

.122

19

.200*

ES

.118

58

.043

.933

58

.003

HS

.369

17

.000

.672

17

.000

MS

.171

19

.146

.927

19

.154

ES

.143

58

.005

.830

58

.000

HS

.260

17

.003

.878

17

.029

MS

.146

19

.200*

.934

19

.208

ES

.053

58

.200*

.992

58

.961

17

.200*

.965

17

.725

19

.200*

.938

19

.239

HS
MS
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.

Shapiro-Wilk

.162
.146

100

Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Performance Level
TT_Earned % of School Budget

Shapiro-Wilk

Statistic

df

Sig.

Statistic

df

Sig.

1 = High Performance

.167

46

.003

.911

46

.002

2 = Low Performance

.120

46

.094

.873

46

.000

.961

46

.124

1 = High Performance

.105

46

.200*

2 = Low Performance

.115

46

.157

.842

46

.000

1 = High Performance

.177

46

.001

.876

46

.000

2 = Low Performance

.100

46

.200*

.959

46

.109

1 = High Performance

.163

46

.003

.888

46

.000

2 = Low Performance

.128

46

.057

.944

46

.027

Support_Earned % of School

1 = High Performance

.151

46

.011

.904

46

.001

Budget

2 = Low Performance

.201

46

.000

.753

46

.000

.932

46

.010

TT_Used % of School Budget

PP_Earned % of School Budget

PP_Used % of School Budget

Support_Used % of School

1 = High Performance

.102

46

.200*

Budget

2 = Low Performance

.146

46

.015

.790

46

.000

NP_Earned % of School Budget

1 = High Performance

.191

46

.000

.783

46

.000

2 = Low Performance

.271

46

.000

.720

46

.000

1 = High Performance

.122

46

.086

.972

46

.338

2 = Low Performance

.148

46

.013

.915

46

.002

NP_Used % of School Budget

*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.

Kolmogorov-Smirnov

TT_Earned % of School Budget

TT_Used % of School Budget

PP_Earned % of School Budget

Shapiro-Wilk

Cohort

Statistic

df

Sig.

Statistic

df

Sig.

1

.143

20

.200*

.949

20

.353

2

.085

37

.200*

.981

37

.764

3

.178

37

.005

.859

37

.000

.963

20

.609

1

.125

20

.200*

2

.114

37

.200*

.960

37

.208

3

.173

37

.007

.817

37

.000

1

.162

20

.177

.907

20

.055

.935

37

.033

2

.111

37

.200*

3

.158

37

.021

.912

37

.006

1

.123

20

.200*

.928

20

.144

2

.137

37

.075

.932

37

.025

3

.179

37

.004

.902

37

.003

Support_Earned % of School

1

.153

20

.200*

.949

20

.349

Budget

2

.171

37

.008

.921

37

.012

3

.216

37

.000

.683

37

.000

.961

20

.564

.947

37

.078

PP_Used % of School Budget

Support_Used % of School

1

.102

20

.200*

Budget

2

.152

37

.030

101

NP_Earned % of School Budget

NP_Used % of School Budget

3

.203

37

.001

.722

37

.000

1

.309

20

.000

.693

20

.000

2

.188

37

.002

.803

37

.000

3

.238

37

.000

.797

37

.000

1

.154

20

.200*

.919

20

.094

2

.098

37

.200*

.968

37

.356

37

.200*

.962

37

.235

3
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.

.115
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APPENDIX D
NON PARAMETRIC TEST FINDINGS
Comparison of Teacher Spending Earned and Used Percent of School Budget, High School
Null Hypothesis

Test

Sig.

The median of differences between

Related-Samples

.407

TT_Earned % of School Budget_HS and

Wilcoxon Signed Rank

TT_Used % of School Budget_HS equals 0.

Test

Total N

Decision
Retain the null
hypothesis.

17

Test Statistic

59.000

Standard Error

21.125

Standardized Test Statistic

-.828

Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test)

.407

Comparison of Paraprofessionals Earned and Used Percent of School Budget, Elementary School
Null Hypothesis

Test

Sig.

The median of differences between

Related-Samples

PP_Earned % of School Budget_ES and

Wilcoxon Signed Rank

PP_Used % of School Budget_ES equals 0.

Test

Total N

Decision

.000 Reject the null hypothesis.

58

Test Statistic

720.000

Standard Error

77.170

Standardized Test Statistic

3.751

Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test)

.000

Comparison of Paraprofessionals Earned and Used Percent of School Budget, Middle School
Null Hypothesis

Test

Sig.

The median of differences between

Related-Samples

PP_Earned % of School Budget_MS and

Wilcoxon Signed Rank

PP_Used % of School Budget_MS equals 0.

Test

Total N

.005 Reject the null hypothesis.

19

Test Statistic

86.000

Standard Error

14.309

Standardized Test Statistic
/Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test)

Decision

2.830
.005
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Comparison of Paraprofessionals Earned and Used Percent of School Budget, High School
Null Hypothesis

Test

Sig.

The median of differences between

Related-Samples Wilcoxon

.754

PP_Earned % of School Budget_HS and

Signed Rank Test

Decision
Retain the null hypothesis.

PP_Used % of School Budget_HS equals 0.
Total N

17

Test Statistic

35.000

Standard Error

12.748

Standardized Test Statistic

-.314

Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test)

.754

Comparison of Support Earned and Used Percent of School Budget, Elementary School
Null Hypothesis
The median of differences between

Test

Sig.

Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank

Decision

.002 Reject the null

Support_Earned % of School Budget_ES and Test

hypothesis.

Support_Used % of School Budget_ES
equals 0.
Total N

58

Test Statistic

1174.000

Standard Error

122.593

Standardized Test Statistic

3.067

Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test)

.002

Comparison of Support Earned and Used Percent of School Budget, High School
Null Hypothesis

Test

The median of differences between

Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank

Support_Earned % of School Budget_HS

Test

and Support_Used % of School
Budget_HS equals 0.
Total N
Test Statistic
Standard Error
Standardized Test Statistic
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test)

17
139.000
21.125
2.959
.003

Sig.

Decision

.003 Reject the null hypothesis.
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Comparison of Non Personnel Earned and Used Percent of School Budget, Elementary School
Null Hypothesis

Test

The median of differences between

Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank

NP_Earned % of School Budget_ES and

Test

Sig.

Decision

.000 Reject the null hypothesis.

NP_Used % of School Budget_ES equals 0.
Total N

58

Test Statistic

182.000

Standard Error

122.593

Standardized Test Statistic

-5.025

Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test)

.000

Comparison of Teacher Spending for High and Low Performing Schools
Null Hypothesis

Test

The median of differences between

Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank

TT_BudgetChange%_HP (ABS) and

Test

Sig.

Decision

.047 Reject the null hypothesis.

TT_BudgetChange%_LP (ABS) equals 0.
Total N

46

Test Statistic

558.000

Standard Error

74.398

Standardized Test Statistic

1.989

Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test)

.047

Comparison of Paraprofessional Spending for High and Low Performing Schools
Null Hypothesis

Test

The median of differences between

Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank

PP_BudgetChange%_HP (ABS) and

Test

PP_BudgetChange%_LP (ABS) equals 0.
Total N
Test Statistic
Standard Error

46
244.000
46.247

Standardized Test Statistic

.573

Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test)

.567

Sig.

Decision

.567 Retain the null hypothesis.
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Comparison of Support Spending for High and Low Performing Schools
Null Hypothesis
The median of differences between

Test
Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank

Sig.

Decision

.045 Reject the null hypothesis.

Support_BudgetChange%_HP (ABS) and Test
Support_BudgetChange%_LP (ABS)
equals 0.
Total N

46

Test Statistic

724.000

Standard Error

91.530

Standardized Test Statistic

2.005

Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test)

.045

Comparison of Non Personnel Spending for High and Low Performing Schools
Null Hypothesis

Test

The median of differences between

Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank

NP_BudgetChange%_HP (ABS) and

Test

NP_BudgetChange%_LP (ABS) equals 0.
Total N
Test Statistic
Standard Error
Standardized Test Statistic
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test)

46
846.000
91.530
3.338
.001

Sig.

Decision

.001 Reject the null hypothesis.

106

Comparison of Percent Change in Budget for Teacher Spending Across Implementation Cohorts
Null Hypothesis

Test

The distribution of TT_BudgetChange%

Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis

(ABS) is the same across categories of

Test

Sig.

Decision

.116 Retain the null hypothesis.

Cohort (1=SY13; 2=SY14; 3=SY15).
Total N

94

Test Statistic

4.305

Degree Of Freedom

2

Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test)

.116

Comparison of Percent Change in Budget for Paraprofessional Spending Across Implementation
Cohorts
Null Hypothesis

Test

The distribution of PP_BudgetChange%

Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis

(ABS) is the same across categories of

Test

Sig.

Decision

.864 Retain the null hypothesis.

Cohort (1=SY13; 2=SY14; 3=SY15).
Total N

94

Test Statistic

.291

Degree Of Freedom

2

Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test)

.864

Comparison of Means of Percent Change in Budget for Support Spending Across
Implementation Cohorts
Null Hypothesis

Test

The distribution of

Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis

Support_BudgetChange% (ABS) is the

Test

same across categories of Cohort
(1=SY13; 2=SY14; 3=SY15).
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .050.

Total N
Test Statistic
Degree Of Freedom
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test)

94
1.077
2
.584

Sig.

Decision

.584 Retain the null hypothesis.
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Comparison of Percent Change in Budget for Non Personnel Spending Across Implementation
Cohorts
Null Hypothesis

Test

The distribution of NP_BudgetChange%

Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis

(ABS) is the same across categories of

Test

Cohort (1=SY13; 2=SY14; 3=SY15).
Total N
Test Statistic
Degree Of Freedom
Asymptotic Sig.(2-sided test)

94
.422
2
.810

Sig.

Decision

.810 Retain the null hypothesis.

